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Chapter 1  
     Introduction 
 
Democratic theory presents accountability as the central solution to the problem 
of representation (Wood 1969). We expect legislators to vote with the median voter in 
their district because they need the median voter to win re-election (Downs 1957). 
Studies of individual decision-making in Congress support this expectation. While other 
influences, such as the party or personal preferences, may arise, members of Congress are 
primarily concerned with re-election and therefore with serving their constituency 
(Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1974; Kingdon 1989). Given this picture of Congressional 
decision-making, we expect the variation in voting behavior within Congress to closely 
follow the different swing voters in each district. 
Theoretical and empirical puzzles arise, however, when we study political 
representation in practice. The absence of politically important social groups, such as 
women, from political office casts doubt on the representativeness of Congress. Theorists 
who stress the need for women in office argue that including marginalized groups within 
Congress will have a substantive impact. Female legislators, they argue, will provide a 
safe avenue for communication between the representative and the excluded group, and 
therefore serve as dedicated advocates for the interests of the group (Phillips 1995; 
Mansbridge 1999).  
However, the literature on the representation of women suffers from two 
important problems. First, the development of a theoretical explanation for why gender 
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should matter in Congressional decision-making is weak. The argument that “gender 
matters” contradicts our conventional theories of Congressional decision-making. Why 
would replacing a male legislator with a female legislator, from the same party and 
similar constituencies, make a difference? Second, the literature ignores differences 
among female legislators in their support of women’s interests. Although legislators’ 
genders affect both voting and non-voting behavior in Congress, there is still 
considerable variation among women, even within the same party. Why do some female 
legislators conform to the expectations of a women’s representative while some do not? 
This puzzle – under what conditions female legislators represent their public 
policy preferences, and presumably thereby the preferences of women generally, instead 
of the interests of the median voter – is the focus of this dissertation. To investigate this 
puzzle, I first frame the question of female legislators’ voting within the literature on 
legislative behavior to understand the constraints under which legislators operate. Given 
this framework, I argue that analyzing when legislators are constrained by the median 
voter versus when they are free to form electoral coalitions consistent with their policy 
preferences can explain when female legislators differ from male legislators. On average, 
I assume that female legislators will want to pursue different policy positions than male 
legislators. However, female legislators will be constrained from voting differently from 
similarly situated male legislators when it is necessary to appeal to the swing voter within 
their district in order to win office.  
I develop an argument of how diverse districts with politically exploitable 
heterogeneity can liberate a legislator from catering to the median voter. These districts 
include constituents who differ over which issues in the district are priorities and differ 
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over how these issues should be addressed in Congress. When constituents disagree over 
priorities and preferences, they form intense preference groups, meaning voters who are 
willing to trade a policy position they do not prefer on other issues for a policy position 
they do prefer on the issue they care about. In these districts, legislators can balance the 
interests of one intense group against the interests of another intense group. This allows 
legislators to choose which groups within the district will be part of their election 
coalition and still win the election. However, this electoral coalition will be unstable, 
meaning that a challenger can also choose and woo groups within the district to be part of 
a different winning coalition, making the district more competitive.  
To test this argument, I present two pieces of evidence. First, I test the assumption 
that female legislators have different policy preferences than male legislators that they 
would like to pursue in office using a national survey and a survey of political elites. In 
both surveys, I find that politically elite women do have different preferences than 
politically elite men, such being more liberal on social welfare issues and social issues. 
However, these preferences do not always coincide with the preferences of politically 
non-elite women. This finding in itself is a significant contribution to the discussion of 
whether female legislators represent their female constituents. It highlights the 
importance of keeping in mind the potential attitudinal differences among women and the 
fact that a female legislator pursues her policy preferences does not mean she is an 
automatic mouthpiece for all women. 
The second component of my research design tests directly whether districts with 
politically exploitable heterogeneity lead to greater gender differences in Congressional 
voting. I use data on educational voting, an area where men and women differ in their 
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opinions, in four Congresses between 1992 and 2000. I measure politically exploitable 
heterogeneity with two different measures. The first depends on national survey data. The 
second is a measure developed from individual contributions to political action 
committees at the district level. I find strongly consistent results across the two measures 
that suggests that in districts where constituents disagree both on priorities and position 
there is actually less divergence between men and women in Congress, contrary to my 
expectations. 
My dissertation will be of interest to scholars who are concerned about 
democratic responsiveness, equality, and the representation of marginalized groups. Are 
women necessary to represent women? Will any female legislator suffice, or are there 
specific qualities that are necessary? How does the quality of representation vary both 
between women and men and among women? What is the role of institutions in 
influencing the representation of women by women and by men? These are all crucial 
questions that substantively affect the lives of women. My dissertation also addresses a 
key problem in the legislative behavior literature. Do legislators’ preferences matter or 
are they merely slaves to their constituency? The debate over whether legislators are 
delegates or trustees continues. I argue that this separation may be too severe and that 
legislators’ preferences may substantially influence how they act as delegates. 
The remainder of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses in 
greater detail the puzzle of gender differences in Congressional voting. Chapter 3 
proposes a theoretical explanation for these gender differences and defines the new 
concept of politically exploitable heterogeneity. Chapter 4 addresses the first aspect of 
my research design, whether politically elite women have different policy preferences 
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than politically elite men and whether these preferences mirror politically non-elite 
women’s preferences. Chapters 5 and 6 comprise the second aspect of my research 
design. Chapter 5 discusses measuring the concept of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity and describes in detail the two measures I propose. Chapter 6 presents the 
results of each of the measures of politically exploitable heterogeneity and discusses the 
implications of the findings. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes. 
Chapter 2, “The Puzzle of the Gender Gap in Congress,” is an in-depth discussion 
of the puzzle leading to the question of the dissertation, under what conditions will 
female legislators represent their public policy preferences instead of the interests of the 
median voter? Both formal theory models of candidate behavior and observational 
studies of legislative behavior argue that candidate policy preferences are insufficient to 
explain candidate divergence, especially on issues that are important to the constituency. 
Given this theoretical and empirical legacy in legislative studies, the presence of the 
gender gap in Congress is puzzling. However, I provide evidence of a gender gap in 
Congressional voting that persists across Congresses and is present on key issues such as 
abortion and education.  
Many formal theorists argue that candidates’ policy preferences alone are 
insufficient to produce legislator divergence and that other assumptions of the basic two 
party competition model need to be modified to allow candidates to diverge in policy 
positions. I present three tests of alternative explanations for the gender gap based on 
modifying assumptions of the basic competition model. The first explanation argues that 
voters are biased towards a political party, in part regardless of the actual issue position 
of the party’s candidates, and this bias allows candidates freedom to move away from the 
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median voter. The second explanation allows for candidates to be chosen through two 
elections, a primary election and a general election, and argues that if the primary 
electorate is systematically different for men and women, we would see divergence 
regardless of legislators’ policy preferences. The third explanation relies on findings that 
when the median voter is more informed about candidates’ positions, she is able to pull 
candidates toward their position. The argument is that female candidates will selectively 
inform female constituents about their position, therefore giving the female median voter 
greater influence in districts with a female candidate. I test each of these explanations 
separately and find that none of them are able to explain the gender gap in Congress. 
Given that the gender gap in Congress is unexplained by these current theories of 
Congressional behavior, I argue for an explanation based on politically exploitable 
heterogeneity, as defined in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3, “Theory: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Legislator 
Divergence,” develops a theory of candidates’ electoral strategy that can support their 
policy preferences in office. First, I provide a review of other arguments regarding 
district heterogeneity and candidate divergence and explain how my theory differs. 
Currently, studies of district heterogeneity and legislator divergence do not provide us 
with an overarching conceptual definition of heterogeneity that connects how 
heterogeneity should lead to divergence. Where my theory differs from the current 
literature is in the proposition that not all heterogeneity is politically exploitable and 
therefore not all forms of heterogeneity should lead to candidate divergence. My model 
both defines conceptually when heterogeneity should matter and has useful implications 
for the empirical studies on this topic that find inconsistent relationships between 
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demographic diversity, used as a measure of heterogeneity in the district, and candidate 
divergence. 
I present my theory in two parts. First, I argue that candidates must form election 
coalitions to win office. If possible, candidates will form a coalition consistent with their 
policy preferences. Second, I argue that politically exploitable heterogeneity in the 
district allows candidates to choose which groups in the district to include in their 
election coalitions and therefore provides electoral support for voting their policy 
preferences in Congress. I define politically exploitable heterogeneity as when 
constituents disagree both on which issues are a priority and on their position on these 
issues. To illustrate how politically exploitable heterogeneity leads to candidate 
divergence, I first provide a formal representation of the model. Second, I provide a 
stylized example. I then discuss how the two parts of the theory together explain how 
legislators in certain districts will vote their policy preferences in office while legislators 
in other districts will be constrained to vote with the median voter. I apply my theory to 
the specific question of gender differences in Congress, pointing out that a key 
component of applying this theory to the puzzle of the gender gap in Congress is the 
assumption that male and female legislators have different policy preferences.  
In Chapter 4, “The Gender Gap in Attitudes Among Elites,” I address the 
fundamental assumption that men and women have different policy preferences they 
would like to pursue in office. This chapter discusses reasons for and against the 
expectation that the gender gap in attitudes found in the mass public will also be present 
among the political elite. I then test for the presence of the gender gap among elites with 
two surveys, each with their advantages and disadvantages. The first survey is the 
 8 
American National Election Surveys from 1992 to 2000. While these surveys allow us to 
compare elites and non-elites, there is evidence that even the respondents designated as 
politically elite in the ANES, as defined by political participation, are significantly 
different in their attitudinal structure from political elites. Second, I use the 1992 
convention delegate survey of attendees to the Democratic and Republican conventions. 
While this survey clearly covers political elites, there are significant differences within 
the survey between those who aspire to public office and those who do not, suggesting 
that elites who run for office may be less ideological than most party convention 
delegates. In addition, it does not allow us to directly compare elite preferences to non-
elite policy preferences. By using the two surveys together, I offset the disadvantages of 
each to get a fuller picture of the gender gap among elites and how this gender gap 
mirrors (or does not) the gender gap among non-elites. I find that the gender gap persists 
among political elites, especially on issues of social welfare, where there is a gender gap 
among non-elites, and emerges on moral issues, such as abortion and school prayer, 
where there is not. 
Chapter 5, “Measuring Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity,” discusses the key 
components of the concept of politically exploitable heterogeneity and how we might 
ideally measure them. Given the complexity of the concept, I focus on one issue, 
education, to simplify measurement. The first important aspect to measure is whether 
there is disagreement over priorities in the district. The relative importance of education 
captures whether constituents disagree on their priority over issues. The second important 
aspect to measure is whether there is in intense preference minority on the issue. If 
constituents are biased in the preference they have on the issue, meaning they have a 
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specific preference on the issue, there is an intense preference minority on the issue of 
education and there is a potential for legislators to exploit this diversity to create an 
electoral coalition consistent with their policy preferences.   
With these guidelines for measurement, I describe the two measures I use. The 
first is based on American National Election Surveys in the 117 districts where ten or 
more respondents were interviewed between 1992 and 2000. I use the ANES questions 
on respondents’ most important issue and respondents’ position on education policy to 
measure the relative importance of education in the district and the presence of bias 
among those who think education is important. While the ANES measure has strong face 
validity, there are serious concerns with using a national survey as a representative 
sample of a sub-national unit, such as a Congressional district. In addition, the ANES 
measure performs poorly in the predictive validity test of the measure’s relationship with 
district competition. The second measure I use is individual contributions in the district to 
political action committees. To my knowledge, this measure has not been used to capture 
constituency preferences before. I connect these contributions to the issues the PACs 
advocate on as a measure of individual priorities across issues. I then get a measure of the 
percentage of the PACs’ money given to Democratic candidates as a measure of the bias 
in the district on the issue of education. The contributions measure performs much better 
on the predictive validity test. However, measuring issue importance with monetary 
donations excludes poorer districts from the measure. Analyzing the effect of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity, imperfectly measured, with both measures allows us to have 
greater confidence in our results than if we used only one measure. 
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Chapter 6, “Empirical Test: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Legislator 
Divergence,” presents the results from both measures of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity. I use the educational voting data described in Chapter 2 to test whether 
politically exploitable heterogeneity modifies the gender gap we found.  For each 
measure, I start with two simple models and then estimate the full three-term interaction 
model. The simpler models include first the measure of the relative importance of 
education and second the measure of bias in the district on the issue of education. 
Consistent with expectations, I find that as the importance of education increases in the 
district, the gender gap diminishes. However, contrary to expectations, the substantive 
decrease of the gender gap due to issue importance is large. In addition, the effect of 
increasing bias in the district on the gender gap, which I expected to be positive and 
significant, is significantly negative. These results are impressively consistent across both 
measures and through an array of robustness checks.  
Finally, chapter 7, “Conclusion,” reviews the dissertation, discusses in greater 
detail the implications of the empirical results for the theory, suggests the empirical and 
theoretical contributions of the dissertation to political science, and proposes further 
empirical investigations. Empirically, the chapter on the gender gap in elite attitudes 
provides evidence that elite women do not necessarily mirror non-elite women in their 
policy preferences. This evidence has important implications for the study of descriptive 
representation and brings into serious doubt the claim that if female legislators pursue 
their preferences they serve the interests of women generally. In addition, the use of 
individual contributions to political action committees as a measure of district attitudes 
 11 
opens the door for other measurement possibilities in the continuing search for better 
measures of constituent preferences. 
Theoretically, the dissertation draws together two literatures – studies on 
descriptive representation and formal models of candidate competition – that have 
important implications for each other but have traditionally been pursued independently 
of each other. The dissertation also tries to develop the connection between the promises 
made by candidates during electoral competition with the subsequent behavior of these 
candidates once elected. While intuitively these two components of a legislators’ 
behavior should be connected, it is not entirely clear how one affects the other. Finally, 
while my measurement of politically exploitable heterogeneity may not yet capture the 
concept, this dissertation importantly distinguishes between politically exploitable and 
politically non-exploitable heterogeneity and pushes political science to more concretely 
define the concept of heterogeneity in the district and how this abstract concept should 





Chapter 2  
   The Puzzle of the Gender Gap in Congress 
  
There is strong empirical evidence that male and female legislators from similar 
districts and the same party vote differently on a wide range of issues, on important and 
obscure legislation, and across multiple Congresses. Descriptive representation scholars 
argue that women’s different policy preferences explain this systematic divergence based 
on gender. However, this empirical evidence and theoretical explanation provides a 
serious puzzle. Recent theoretical proofs argue that policy preferences are not sufficient 
to provide candidate divergence and classical studies of legislative behavior find that 
legislators prioritize the wishes of their constituency above their own policy preferences. 
Other plausible explanations for candidate divergence – such as partisan biased voters, 
systematically different primaries, and voter information levels – also do not explain 
these consistent gender differences in Congressional voting. This contradiction between 
theoretical explanations and empirical evidence leads to the question of this dissertation, 
under what conditions will legislators pursue their preferences in representing their 
constituency? 
 In this chapter, I present the empirical evidence for the puzzle of the dissertation. 
First, I describe in greater detail the empirical and theoretical puzzle of gender 
differences in Congress. Second, I provide evidence that gender differences in legislative 
voting persist in more recent Congresses. Third, I present the tests of three explanations 
for candidate divergence based on gender – partisan biased voters, systematically 
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different primaries, and differential voter information levels. Finally, I conclude with a 
preview of my explanation for Congressional gender differences – politically exploitable 
heterogeneity. 
 
2.1 The Empirical and Theoretical Puzzle of Gender Differences in Congress 
There is building evidence that aspects of a legislator’s identity matter for her 
legislative behavior (Dodson 2001; Kathlene 1998; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 1998; 
Swers 2002; Tamerius 1995). Finding convincing evidence for this is hard because it is 
difficult to parse out the effect of legislators’ preferences from the effect of constituency. 
For example, Hall argues that African-American legislators should behave in a distinctive 
fashion from white legislators because African-American legislators tend to have large 
African-American constituencies and a social identification with their group (Hall, 
Unpublished Manuscript). However, African-American legislators are rarely elected in 
districts without a plurality of African-American voters and even more rarely elected in 
districts without a majority-minority population (Cameron, Epstein, O’Halloran 1996; 
Lublin 1999). Given this co-variation between large minority constituencies and the 
election of African-American legislators, the preferences of the legislator are likely to 
converge with a majority of the district and therefore we cannot distinguish between the 
effect of a large minority constituency and the effect of a social identification with the 
group. 
However, unlike racial and ethnic minority groups, or even any other interest 
group, women are not segregated geographically. It is highly unlikely for a district to 
have a large majority of women relative to the number of men. Yet, when women are 
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elected, they tend to behave differently than men (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998; 
Carroll 2001; Clark 1998; Dodson 2001; Kathlene 1998; Little, Dunn, and Deen 2001; 
Reingold 1992; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 1998; Swers 2002; Tamerius 1995; Thomas 
and Welch 1991; Welch 1985). For example, Tamerius (1995) found in her matched 
sample of male and female legislators from the 101
st
 Congress that female legislators 
were responsible for sponsoring 92% of the feminist bills. Welch (1985) found that, 
controlling for district characteristics, female legislators were more liberal than men on 
their roll call votes from 1972 to 1980. The differences were most pronounced for 
Republican legislators. Swers (2002) found significant differences between men and 
women in the 103
rd
 (1993-1994) and 104
th
 (1995-1996) Congresses on feminist and 
social welfare issues, controlling for legislator ideology, legislator party, and 
constituency characteristics. While the differences among Republicans were much 
smaller in the 104
th
 Congress, Swers found that the biggest and most consistent gender 




 Congresses were on reproductive rights votes 
(Swers 2002, p. 121).  
Scholars of descriptive representation argue that legislators substantively 
represent a subset of their constituency based on their preferences and potentially 
contrary to the wishes of the median voter in their district (Tamerius 1995, Dodson 2001, 
Mansbridge 1999). Most scholars who investigate the impact of descriptive 
representation assume that this substantive representation is driven by a legislator’s social 
identification with her group (Tamerius 1995, Dodson 2001). The argument is that when 
a legislator identifies with a group, either because of shared experiences or because of a 
linked fate between group members, the legislator will also share the group’s preferences. 
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Descriptive representation scholars expect that a legislator will follow her preferences, 
and therefore her group’s preferences, in her voting and non-voting behavior.  
For the most part, scholars who study female legislators argue that women will 
behave differently without theorizing as to under what conditions this will occur or why. 
One scholar, Karin Tamerius, did develop theoretical expectations as to when gender 
differences in the legislature emerge. Tamerius argues that because female legislators 
possess differential experience and resources with respect to women’s issues, we should 
only see gender differences in behavior areas that require high levels of attitudinal 
support and resources. She concludes, therefore, that activities that require more support 
and expertise, such as sponsoring a bill or making a speech, will exhibit greater sex 
differences than those activities that require relatively less support and expertise, such as 
roll call voting (Tamerius, 1995). However, this theory does not explain the differences 
we find between female and male legislators in roll call votes.  
The argument that female legislators follow their different policy preferences 
leads to both a theoretical and empirical puzzle when assessed in the context of the 
legislative behavior literature. This argument violates a fundamental assumption of the 
median voter theory that candidates are solely motivated by gaining office. However, the 
median voter theory is most likely wrong, as illustrated by a quote from Ansolabehere 
describing political economists’ view of the median voter theorem:  
“The strong empirical prediction [of the median voter theory] is almost 
surely wrong and, as a result, one of the basic assumptions is incorrect. 
The challenge is to find the factor or factors that explain divergence” 
(Ansolabehere 2006). 
  
The question is, is modifying the assumption that legislators are motivated by policy 
preferences sufficient to induce candidate divergence? The way to incorporate 
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preferences into candidates’ decisions is to change their utility function. Instead of just 
gaining utility from winning office, there is now a tradeoff between winning office and 
how far the candidate must move from their ideal preference in order to win office. Most 
scholars argue that other assumptions need to be changed in order for divergence to 
occur. For example, Calvert (1985) argued that as long as candidates prefer the median 
voter’s position to the position of their opponent, they will move towards the median 
voter because they value winning certainly at the median voter’s position more than 
gaining their ideal policy with ! probability. Similarly, others argue that while 
candidates’ preferences might create divergence in the short-term, the median is the limit 
in a sequence of elections where a moderate can enter the race and win (Ansolabehere 
2006).  
In addition to theoretical results that argue that candidate preferences are not 
sufficient to induce candidate divergence, there is strong empirical evidence that 
candidates’ preferences are not influential on their voting behavior. Peltzman (1984) 
argues that when constituency interest is correctly specified, with both supporting and 
opposing interests included in the model, the roles of party and ideology in explaining 
roll-call votes fade, meaning that divergence diminishes. In classic studies of legislative 
behavior, the evidence that legislators listen to their constituency first and foremost in 
their voting decisions is overwhelming (Achen 1978; Fiorina 1974; Jackson 1974; 
Kingdon 1989; Miller and Stokes 1963). Furthermore, the distinction between 
preferences and re-election is only relevant if the legislator’s preferences are contrary to 
that of the constituency, which tends to be rare given the selection process of legislators 
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(Kingdon 1989). Even when legislators’ preferences do come into play, it is in situations 
where the constituency does not care about the issue (Kingdon 1989).  
Since simply changing the assumption that legislators value their policy 
preferences in addition to winning office does not satisfactorily explain the divergence 
between men and women, we need to turn to other aspects of models of legislative 
behavior. Many political economists have studied the effects of changing some of the 
basic assumptions of the Downsian model to explain divergence within a district. 
However, there are some limitations of the current research. First, a considerable amount 
of the work attempts to explain divergence between parties within similar districts and 
not divergence within parties. Many of the theoretical results that explain divergence 
between parties may be helpful in explaining divergence within parties as well. Second, 
there is a tendency within the literature for a disjuncture of theory and data (Wittman 
1983). There is a considerable amount of theoretical work that remains to be tested, as 
well as a considerable amount of empirical work that is divorced from theoretical 
explanations.  
To find an answer to the question of when candidates diverge based on gender, I 
turned to assumptions of the median voter theorem that, when changed, might lead to 
systematic variation by gender in Congress. In this chapter, I present and analyze three 
modifications to the model. The first is partisan biased voters. The expectation is that 
members of Congress from districts where voters are biased towards the legislator’s party 
have the freedom to pursue their policy preferences in office. To test this argument, I 
analyze whether the gender difference in Congress increases in districts where there are 
larger numbers of voters that support the legislator’s party, as measured by Presidential 
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vote. The second modification is the possibility of systematically different primary 
voters. If female legislators have a more liberal median voter in the primary than male 
legislators, with the median voter in the general election held constant, then female 
legislators will be more liberal than male legislators, regardless of the legislators’ 
personal preferences. To test this argument, I compare data on the attitude of the mean 
primary voter in legislators’ districts from the National Annenberg Election Study by sex 
of the legislators. The third modification I test is differential voter information levels. The 
argument is when voters have more information, they are more sensitive to candidates’ 
positions and therefore candidates are pulled towards the median voter. Applying this to 
female candidates, if female candidates raise information levels among female voters, as 
others have argued they do, then districts where there is a female candidate will have 
more informed female voters and the median female voter will have more influence over 
legislators’ votes. Given the gender difference in policy preferences, this should lead 
these legislators to be more liberal in their voting. I test the intermediate link in the 
theory, that female legislators increase female voters’ information levels, with the 
American National Election Study’s measures of political information and data on the 
candidates’ genders in the district between 1992 and 2000. As will be evident by the end 
of the chapter, these three plausible explanations also do not explain the gender gap in 
Congress. This leaves us with the question of the dissertation: under what conditions and 






2.2 Persistent Gender Gap in Congressional Voting 
Before answering under what conditions female and male legislators diverge in 
their Congressional behavior, it is important to establish that the divergence continues to 
persist past the early 1990’s. Both Swers (2002) and Poole and Ziegler (1985) argue that 
Republican control of Congress will eliminate the gender gap in Congressional voting. In 
part, this is because when Republicans are in the majority, the bills that reach the floor 
may not address women’s issues and therefore the issue areas where gender differences 
would arise are not part of the roll call. To confirm the presence of a gender gap in 
Congress across more recent Congresses, I investigated whether female representatives 
vote differently than male representatives from similar constituencies and the same party 
in more recent Congresses. I completed three analyses. First, I analyzed the gender 
difference in the 103
rd
 Congress on bills identified by the American Association of 
University Women (AAUW) as critical to women’s interests. Second, I analyzed the 
gender differences in the 106
th
 Congress on AAUW votes. Finally, since men and women 
in the mass public disagree on spending on public education (Kaufmann and Petrocik 









 Congresses. Using these four Congresses increases the 
number of women available for analysis and varies the partisan control of Congress.  
I first created a measure of district attitude by following Jackson (1990). I 
estimated the relationship between demographics and individual opinion using American 
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National Election Study data from the year of election to Congress.
1
 The demographics 
included everything in the ANES that is available from the Census by Congressional 
district – age, marital status, education, employment status, income, gender, and race. 
Then, using Census data and the coefficients from the individual regressions, I created a 
predicted average opinion for each Congressional district.  
For the roll call votes, I used the Poole and Rosenthal data sets available on their 
VoteView website.
2




 Congresses, I 
used the American Association of University Women’s legislative voting record 
(American Association of University Women, Voting Record). To code these bills, I used 
the AAUW’s recommendations. For the bills, a 0 is a vote against AAUW’s position and 
a 1 is a vote for AAUW’s position. The bills cover education, abortion, family leave, and 
health care. The AAUW supports greater access to education for women, greater access 
to abortion for women, federal support for family leave, and greater federal support for 
women and children’s health care. The votes included in the AAUW legislative record 
include both votes on amendments and votes on final bills. 
The education bills for all four Congresses were more difficult to code and 
identify. To identify education bills, I used the Policy Agendas Project’s coding of bill 
topics
3
. The Policy Agendas Project only codes final bills. Therefore, the education bill 
scales only include votes on final bills and not amendments. To code the education bills, I 





 Congresses (National Education Association, Congressional Report 




 Congress (1993-1994), I used the 1992 ANES; for 104
th
 Congress (1995-1996), the 1994 
ANES; for the 105
th
 Congress (1997-1998), the 1996 ANES; and for the 106
th







Card). For earlier Congresses, I used the legislative voting records from the AAUW and 
the Americans for Democratic Action (Americans for Democratic Action, Voting 




 Congresses the rating of bills by the NEA matched the 
ratings of both the AAUW and the ADA. For bills rated by the NEA, AAUW, or ADA, I 
coded a 0 as a vote against the interest groups’ position and 1 as a vote for the interest 
groups’ position. All three groups support greater federal spending on public education. 
In the dataset, I have two sets of education bills – one that includes just those bills rated 
by the NEA, AAUW, or ADA and one that covers all bills designated as an education bill 
by the Policy Agendas Project.  
To code bills not rated by the advocacy groups, I first created a list of legislators 




 Congresses that were 




 Congresses. I also created a list of legislators with a 




 Congresses that were in 




 Congresses. This gave me a list of 25 legislators who tend 
to vote with the NEA by voting for more public spending for education and a list of 4 
legislators who tend to vote against the NEA. Using this list of legislators, I then looked 
at how they voted on the other education bills that were not rated by the 
NEA/AAUW/ADA in each of the Congresses. I then coded only those bills where at least 
80% of the high NEA rated legislators voted against 80% of the low NEA rated 
legislators. A 1 represents a vote with the high NEA rated legislators and a 0 represents a 
vote with the low NEA rated legislators. Both of the roll call vote variables are a 
composite scale of voting across all legislation included in the scale. For the 
NEA/AAUW/ADA-rated votes only scale, the number of votes in the scale for each 
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), and 5 (106
th
). For the second scale, the 






), and 9 (106
th
). 
To gather data on the legislators’ gender, seniority, and party, I used the 
biographical data provided by Congressional Quarterly.
4
 I also created dummy variables 
for each Congress. In the pooled estimations with the education vote scales as the 
dependent variable, I included these dummy variables with the 103
rd
 Congress as the 
excluded group. For the individual votes in the AAUW scale, the composite AAUW 















I found significant gender differences on multiple votes. The results of the 
analyses are in tables 2.1-2.3. On all AAUW votes in the 103
rd
 Congress, including votes 
on family leave, abortion, and education, a significant gender difference arises. The 
difference is much larger for Republicans, with an effect of gender between .310 and 
.589, than for Democrats, with an effect of gender between .085 and .352. In the 106
th
 
Congress, there were also significant gender differences on AAUW votes related to 
education and abortion. However, there were no gender differences on health care bills 
and the magnitude of the effect was smaller for both Republicans and Democrats 
(between 0 and .334 and between 0 and .325, respectively). 
On the education bills, the effects are similar across the two scales – the bills rated 





 Congresses as well as in the pooled analysis. While the magnitude of the 




 Congresses as in the 106
th
 Congress, the 




effects are statistically insignificant at the .1 level. Overall, gender differences emerge as 
substantively and statistically significant on a range of issues and across different 
Congresses. These systematic gender differences contradict traditional explanations of 
Congressional voting behavior and leave us with the question of the dissertation, under 
what conditions will legislators converge in their legislative behavior and under what 
conditions will legislators pursue their preferences in representing their constituency? 
 
2.3 District Conditions of Converge and Divergence 
 Given this strong evidence of gender differences in Congress on roll-call votes 
and the inadequacy of the candidates’ preferences explanation, I turned to other 
assumptions in the median voter theory. In this section, I test the effect of changing three 
important assumptions. First, that voters vote for candidates solely on the basis of policy. 
Second, that candidates are chosen in one round of elections. And finally, that all voters 
have perfect information. I find in my analysis that none of these plausible changes are a 
satisfactory explanation for the gender gap in Congress. 
 
2.3.1 Partisan Biased Voters 
One condition that may explain divergence among candidates is the presence of 
biased voters. This condition modifies the assumption that voters choose candidates 
solely on the grounds of their policy position. As is commonly found in attitude studies, 
voters use multiple other characteristics besides policy to make their voting decisions. 
These characteristics may be correlated with policy but also have a separate component. 
One common example is party identification. While party identification is correlated with 
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policy, there is also an enduring attachment to political parties that persists despite policy 
platform changes in any given election cycle (Campbell et al 1960). For example, in the 
cumulative NES dataset, the correlation between party identification and policy position 
ranges from .04 for attitudes about abortion to .30 for attitudes about spending on the 
poor. There is a considerable amount of overlap between Democrats and Republicans on 
policy position in the NES. In addition, party identification is a strong determinant in vote 
choice. 
Changing the assumption that voters vote solely on the basis of policy positions 
can create divergence between candidates. Theorists represent the inclusion of a non-
policy bias among voters by including a “bias term” in voters’ utility functions in 
addition to a measure of policy distance between the voters and candidates. With biased 
voters, the candidate who has the advantage has leeway to place herself farther away 
from the median voter on policy than her opponent without jeopardizing her chance of 
winning. The candidate who is disadvantaged in terms of the bias will instead move 
towards the median voter in an attempt to woo voters who are biased towards the other 
candidate (Chappell and Keech 1986; Adams 2001; Wittman 1983). This argument 
provides an explanation for the pattern other scholars find that candidates in competitive 
elections move towards each other while candidates in non-competitive elections do not. 
For example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) find less divergence between 
House candidates in competitive districts, as measured by the Republican Party vote from 
the last Presidential election. 
To translate this argument to male and female legislators, we must assume that 
male and female legislators have different policy preferences they want to pursue in 
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Congress. They will only be able to pursue these policy preferences when they are 
advantaged by partisan bias. Therefore, we expect that female legislators who are 
disadvantaged by bias will be less likely to diverge from similarly situated male 
legislators than female legislators who are advantaged by bias in their districts.  
To test this hypothesis, I used the roll call datasets described above – the AAUW 









Congresses. To measure bias, I used the Presidential vote in the district from the most 
recent prior Presidential election. If the legislator is Republican, the bias measure was 
calculated as the vote for the Republican Presidential candidate minus the vote for the 
Democratic Presidential candidate. For Democrats, the subtraction was reversed. The 
measure runs from around -40 to 90. Negative numbers indicate the legislator was 
disadvantaged by the partisan make-up of the district, as measured by the Presidential 
vote, while positive numbers indicate the legislator was advantaged by the partisan make-
up. We should see a positive interaction between partisan advantage in the district and the 
effect of being female on voting because partisan bias should allow for greater 
divergence based on candidate preference. As before, I control for district attitude, 

















The results from the analysis are in Table 2.4. The effect of partisan bias is not 
significant in any of the models and only in the correct direction in one of the models, for 




 Congresses. At the bottom of the table are the 
effects of being female on the predicted level of support for the AAUW score and the 
education bills score for minus one standard deviation of the bias scale, the mean of the 
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bias scale, and plus one standard deviation of the bias scale. All dependent variables are 
scaled from 0 to 1. An increase in bias causes the gender gap in voting on the AAUW 
scale to decrease by almost .05 points in the 103
rd
 Congress and by almost .09 points in 
the 106
th




 Congresses, an increase in bias causes the 
gender gap in voting on education bills to increase by only .008 points. It appears that 
partisan voters do not explain when male and female legislators will diverge from each 
other. 
 
2.3.2 Systematically Different Primaries 
The second condition I analyze changes the assumption that candidates must win 
only one election. Instead, candidates must first win their party primaries and then run in 
the general election. Scholars argue that the presence of party primaries can induce 
divergence in candidate positioning. To win, candidates must balance the median voter of 
the party and the median voter of the general election. Candidates from the right party 
will seek the position where the left-most voter in the right party is indifferent between 
the candidate’s position and the opponent’s position (Grofman 2004; Coleman 1971). 
The evidence for this argument is spotty. In assessing the influence of the party median 
on legislators’ roll call votes, Clinton (2006) found that Republican legislators from the 
106
th
 Congress were responsive to their party median but Democratic legislators were 
responsive to the opposite party median. This is probably due to which party has a 
majority in the legislature and whom they need to appeal to in order to win the next 
election than due to anything enduring about the two parties. Gerber and Lewis (2004) 
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found that the party median attitude had no significant effect on legislator voting once 
legislator party and the district median attitude were included in the model. 
Despite this somewhat unsupportive evidence, the primaries argument has 
potential for explaining divergence between male and female legislators in an interesting 
way. There is evidence that voters view female candidates as supportive of more liberal 
policies than male candidates, holding campaign promises and appeals constant (Huddy 
and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu 2002). If voters view women as more liberal than 
men regardless of their actual policy position, we might expect women to have more 
success among more liberal voters in their party. Therefore, winning female legislators 
might be nominated by systematically different primary electorates than male legislators 
from the same party. If so, then different party medians may explain divergence between 
men and women in Congress. What is interesting about this explanation is that it does not 
require male and female legislators to have different preferences to create a systematic 
gender gap in Congressional voting.  
To test this hypothesis, I used the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election 
Studies. The NAES is helpful because the study has a large number of respondents, above 
40,000, and covers most Congressional districts. This large number of respondents allows 
for analysis of sub-groups within the district that is not possible with other surveys 
(Clinton 2006). To test whether female and male legislators have systematically different 
primary (or party) voters, I recoded the 2000 NAES on six different issue areas: 
liberal/conservative ideological placement; support for federal spending on social 
security; support for federal spending on schools; support for government health care for 
uninsured children; opposition to banning abortion; and opposition to government 
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spending on defense. In the 2004 NAES, I recoded six similar issue areas. The only 
difference in question wording was on social security. Instead of federal spending, the 
question asked whether the respondent favored allowing workers to invest part of their 
social security. I coded this such that higher values represented opposition to this 
proposal. I coded each of these issue areas such that higher values represented the 
direction of the gender gap in voting in Congress – with women more liberal than men on 
these areas. 
I then summarized by Congressional district the mean position on each of these 
issues for the entire district, for party identifiers (as measured by the party identification 
question), and for party primary voters (as measured by whether the respondent voted in 
the party primary and identified with the party). I then merged this information with party 
and sex data on the legislators elected from each Congressional district in the year the 
survey was taken (the 107
th
 Congress for 2000 and the 109
th
 Congress for 2004). I 







DistrictPosition + #  
On these issues, if women have systematically different primary voters that 
explain their systematically different voting in Congress, we should find a significant and 
positive coefficient on the female variable. The results from the analysis are in table 2.5. 
The farthest left column lists the issue area. The cells report the coefficient on female, 
with standard errors in parentheses, by party, first for party identifiers and second for 
party primary voters as the dependent variable. Rarely is the coefficient on female 
significant. Out of 24 circumstances in 2000, the coefficient on female was significant at 
the .1 significance level or lower 3 times. Of these 3 times, all of them were in the 
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opposite direction than predicted. Out of 24 circumstances in 2004, the coefficient on 
female was significant 5 times. Again, all of these coefficients were opposite the 
predicted direction. In addition, none of the effects were substantively significant, 
ranging from .01 to .06 points on a 0 to 1 scale. On the whole, the evidence does not 
support the argument that male and female legislators have systematically different 
primary or party supporters. 
 
2.3.3 Voter Information and Turnout 
The final condition I analyze modifies the assumption of the median voter theory 
of perfect information. If there is not perfect information, the less information voters have 
about the candidates, the less tied the candidates are to the median voter (Wittman 1983). 
There is some evidence that statewide female candidates increase the efficacy and 
political knowledge of their female constituents (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). 
One explanation for this is that female candidates may target female voters in order to 
garner support in the district. If female candidates increase the knowledge of women in 
the district relative to women in districts with no female candidate, the women with a 
female candidate may be more sensitive to the policies presented by the candidates. This 
may pull candidates closer to the female median voter than in other districts, which 
would mean that the female median voter would hold more weight in explaining roll call 
votes among female legislators than among male legislators who faced male opponents. 
However, and this would be an interesting result, it would also mean that there should not 
be a difference between female legislators and male legislators who defeated a female 
opponent. 
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Another result of the evidence that women’s interest and efficacy increases when 
they have a female candidate is the gender participation gap can decrease in areas with a 
female candidate. Burns et al (2001) find that the increase in efficacy and interest could 
help to narrow the participation gap. They find that with one statewide female candidate, 
the number of political acts in which women participate increases by almost one – closing 
the gender participation gap by half. This could be interpreted as descreasing the “costs” 
of voting for women by increasing their efficacy and political knowledge. If female 
candidates affect who turns out, this could mean they have a different median voter than 
male candidates who face male opponents. Again, with this change, we would expect the 
female median voter to have greater influence over female legislators’ roll call voting, as 
well as over male legislators’ voting who faced a female opponent. 
 To assess this explanation, I tested the intervening mechanism – the effect of 
female candidates on the information of female voters. To test the two hypotheses – that 
female candidates increase women’s political information and participation – I used the 
American National Election Studies from 1992 through 2004. The ANES includes 
questions on whether the respondent was contacted by each party’s House candidate; the 
respondent’s level of political participation; whether the respondent voted in the general 
election; whether the respondent recalls the names of her House candidates correctly; and 
whether the respondent can place each party’s House candidate on three issue areas: 
liberal/conservative ideology, government spending on services, and government 
guaranteed jobs. The level of contact gets directly at the mechanism proposed above – 
that female candidates will target female voters directly. The participation and voting 
variables capture whether female candidates increase female voters’ political 
 31 
participation. Finally, the recall variables and the issue placement variables capture 
whether female candidates increase female voters’ level of knowledge. 
All variables are coded 0 to 1 except participation, which runs from 0 to 5 and is a 
summary of the number of political acts from the following list: contribute money, 
display a campaign button or sticker, work for a party or candidate, attend political 
meetings or rallies, and try to influence others. For the contact, participation, voting, and 
recall variables, higher values indicate greater contact, participation, and information, 
respectively. For the issue placement variables, the coding is 0 represents respondents 
who placed their House candidate on the seven-point scale and 1 represents respondents 
who said “Don’t Know” to the question. I merged the respondent data with information 
on both parties’ House candidates’ sex in the Congressional district for the year of the 
survey (Almanac of American Politics). For each dependent variable, I estimated the 













The controls are age, education, employment, income, home ownership, religious 
attendance, partisanship, and competitiveness of the Congressional race. Competitiveness 
of the Congressional race is measured as the absolute value of the Presidential vote 
margin from the most recent prior Presidential election. I estimated the model with logit 
for the contact, vote, recall, and issue placement dependent variables and with OLS for 





) to be positive for the contact, participation, vote, and recall 
dependent variables and negative for the issue placement variables.  
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The results of the analysis are in table 2.6 and table 2.7. The effect of female 




) is reported in the middle row. Below the 
effect is the standard error of the combined coefficients in parentheses. This standard 
error was calculated with the formula (Aiken and West 1991):  
ˆ " #DV
#FC
2 = var ˆ $ 
2( ) + FR2 var ˆ $ 3( ) + 2FRcov ˆ $ 2 ˆ $ 3( )  
There is relatively weak support for the hypotheses. The effect of female 
candidates on female respondents is almost always in the correct direction, except for 
Republican female candidates’ effect on contacting female respondents and all female 
candidates’ effect on female respondents’ voting. However, the effect is rarely 
statistically or substantively significant. The effect of female candidates on women’s 
contact, recall, and issue placement is between 0 and 4%. Female candidates increase the 
number of women’s political acts by between .03 and .05 on a 0 to 5 scale. The difference 
between female candidates’ effect on male respondents versus female respondents is 
never significant; the effect of female candidates on male respondents is never 
significant; and the effect of female candidates on female respondents is significant at the 
.05 level in only two instances – women recalling a Democratic female candidate’s name 
and women being less likely to say “Don’t Know” to placing a Democratic female 
candidate on the liberal/conservative ideology scale. Overall, there is little support for the 
argument that female candidates increase women’s political knowledge or participation 





2.4 Moving Forward: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity 
 In this chapter, I presented a theoretical and empirical puzzle. While studies on 
Congressional behavior find that the constituency and the median voter have a strong 
hold on legislators’ voting decisions, descriptive representation scholars argue, and find 
empirical evidence, that female legislators are systematically more liberal than male 
legislators from the same party and similar districts on a subset of issues, such as 
abortion, education, and family leave. Three plausible explanations for this consistent 
empirical finding – partisan biased voters, systematically different primary voters, and 
differential voter information levels – do not explain the divergence we find between men 
and women in Congress. In the next chapter, I argue that the presence of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity in the district can explain this divergence. When a candidate is 
faced with a politically exploitable heterogeneous district, she can choose which groups 
in the district will be part of her electoral coalition. By choosing groups with whom she 
































































































R2 .423 .356 .438 .357 .273 .573 .600 
N 428 422 427 415 423 417 378 
ME of Sex: 
Republicans 
.368 .589 .310 .527 .404 .524 -- 
ME of Sex: 
Democrats 
.085 .118 .352 .164 .154 .016 -- 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For the individual bills, the table includes the logit coefficient and standard error in parentheses, with the marginal effect of 
sex calculated by party with other variables set at their mean in the bottom two rows; For the AAUW scale, the table includes OLS coefficients and standard 







Table 2.2 Gender Differences in the 106th Congress (1999-2000) on AAUW votes 






















































































































R2 .377 .531 .798 .386 .439 .412 .673 .546 .804 
N 422 423 421 427 428 416 431 424 376 
ME of Sex: 
Republicans 
.299 .199 .102 .334 .134 .422 .008 .147 -- 
ME of Sex: 
Democrats 
.004 .010 .023 .154 .325 .179 .001 .006 -- 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For the individual bills, the table includes the logit coefficient and standard error in parentheses, with the marginal effect of 
sex calculated by party with other variables set at their mean in the bottom two rows; For the AAUW scale, the table includes OLS coefficients and standard 







Table 2.3 Gender Differences in the 103rd through 106th Congress (1993-2000) on Education Bills 




























































































































R2 .766 .678 .718 .809 .815 .862 .761 .830 .917 .935 
N 1743 434 427 444 438 1760 437 445 439 439 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For the individual bills, the table includes the OLS coefficient and standard error in parentheses, except for the 104
th
 Congress 




, and the 106
th
 
Congress, with the 103
rd
































































R2 .600 .804 .864 
N 377 374 1732 
Effect of Female: 
-1 SD in Bias 
.241 .182 .052 
Effect of Female: 
Mean Bias 
.218 .138 .056 
Effect of Female: 
+1 SD in Bias 
.195 .094 .060 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For the individual bills, the table includes the OLS coefficient and standard error in parentheses. Below the table of 









, and the 106
th
 Congress, with the 103
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Table 2.5 Primaries – Effect of Legislator Sex on Party and Primary Voter Attitudes 
Party/Voter Type Republicans Rep. Primary Voters Democrats Dem. Primary Voters 
2000 NAES – 107
th























































2004 NAES – 109
th



























































Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; # indicates estimations with fewer than 50 (but more than 20) Congressional districts. Included in the table is the OLS 
coefficient on sex. Estimations include a control for estimated mean position of all respondents in the district on the same attitude variable and are estimated by 






Table 2.6 Female Candidates and Female Voters’ Information: Contact, Participation, and Name Recall 
 Contact: Dem Contact: Rep Participation Voted Recall: Dem Recall: Rep 
















































R2 .026 .091 .088 .179 .073 .124 
N 3163 3251 8113 8111 6697 6908 












Male Resp       
Male Cand .736 .596 .917 .858 .261 .250 
Female Cand .733 .558 .961 .852 .263 .258 
Female Resp       
Male Cand .708 .570 .777 .846 .197 .199 
Female Cand .699 .596 .809 .845 .232 .211 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For recall, contact, and voting, the table includes logit coefficients. For participation, the table includes the OLS coefficient 
and standard error in parentheses. In the middle row is the calculated effect of female candidates on female respondents with the computed standard error in 
parentheses. Below the table of coefficients are the predicted probabilities for men and women by sex of candidate. All models control for age, education, 







Table 2.7 Female Candidates and Female Voters’ Information: “Don’t Know” to Placement of Candidates on Issues 
 Liberal/Conservative Spending on Services Guaranteed Jobs 
 Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep 
















































R2 .025 .063 .030 .058 .028 .052 
N 5624 5657 4406 4732 2251 2501 












Male Cand       
Male Resp .451 .432 .405 .417 .368 .426 
Female Resp .435 .432 .401 .395 .413 .402 
Female Cand       
Male Resp .528 .505 .501 .513 .445 .527 
Female Resp .480 .471 .473 .490 .445 .488 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01; For recall, contact, and voting, the table includes logit coefficients. For participation, the table includes the OLS coefficient 
and standard error in parentheses. In the middle row is the calculated effect of female candidates on female respondents with the computed standard error in 
parentheses. Below the table of coefficients are the predicted probabilities for men and women by sex of candidate. All models control for age, education, 
employment, income, home ownership, religious attendance, partisanship, and competitiveness of the Congressional race. 
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Chapter 3  
   Theory: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Legislator Divergence 
 
The puzzle of the dissertation is that, contrary to the predictions of the median 
voter theory, legislators from similar districts and the same party do not always behave in 
the same way. I find that even controlling for district characteristics and party, women are 
more liberal than men on a variety of issues. In addition, some plausible explanations for 
why this divergence might occur – partisan biased voters, systematically different 
primary electorates, or differential voter information – do not explain the gender 
difference in Congress. This leaves us with the question: under what conditions will 
legislators pursue their preferences in representing their constituency? 
 In this chapter, I develop a theory of candidates’ electoral strategy that can 
support their policy preferences in office. To win office, candidates must form election 
coalitions in the district that include enough voters to comprise a winning plurality. 
Districts with politically exploitable heterogeneity can liberate legislators to move away 
from the median voter and choose which groups within the district will be part of their 
election coalition. In these districts, legislators will woo groups that agree with their 
preferred policy position to be part of their election coalition. By doing so, legislators 
build electoral support within the constituency for pursuing their preferred policy 
positions in Congress. In more homogenous districts, on the other hand, legislators are 
constrained to appeal to the median voter to win office and therefore are constrained in 
their voting in Congress. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I review the literature on heterogeneity and 
candidate divergence, highlighting how my theory differs. Second, I explain the first 
component of the theory – that legislators must form an election constituency to win 
office and would prefer to build an election constituency consistent with their policy 
preferences. Third, I discuss the second component of the theory – what constitutes 
politically exploitable heterogeneity and how politically exploitable heterogeneity leads 
to candidate divergence. Fourth, I tie the two parts of the theory together and propose 
three testable hypotheses. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of my theory and how it 
might contribute to other important topics in political science, such as candidates’ 
campaign behavior and citizens’ vote choice. 
 
3.1 Literature on Heterogeneity and Candidate Divergence 
The suggestion that heterogeneity affects candidate divergence is not new. 
Multiple scholars argue that heterogeneity in the constituency should lead to candidate 
divergence. However what is not clear, and where I expect to build on the current 
research, is whether any type of heterogeneity is politically exploitable heterogeneity or if 
there is politically non-exploitable heterogeneity. Where my theory parts ways with the 
extant literature is in the proposition, developed in this chapter, that not all heterogeneity 
is politically exploitable.  I argue that we should only expect heterogeneity to lead to 
candidate divergence in a district that consists of voters who disagree on their positions 
on issues and disagree on the relative priority of these issues. I also argue that not all 
forms of heterogeneity include these two components and therefore not all forms of 
heterogeneity should lead to divergence. My model both defines conceptually why 
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heterogeneity should matter and has useful implications for the empirical studies on this 
topic that find inconsistent relationships between demographic diversity, used as a 
measure of heterogeneity in the district, and candidate divergence.  
Fiorina (1974) argues that heterogeneity can affect whether or not candidates 
diverge in their representation of a district. He defines heterogeneity as a district where 
there is conflict over policy positions. He argues that when there is conflict within the 
district, candidates can cultivate different election constituencies and represent their side 
of the conflict when in office (Fiorina 1974, pp. 100-103). Because there is conflict 
within the district, the district should also be highly competitive politically (Fiorina 1974, 
pp. 90-91). To test this, Fiorina presents two pieces of evidence. First, he presents 
evidence that demographic diversity in the district, as a measure of conflict, correlates 
with partisan competition in the district (Fiorina 1974, pp. 94-100). Second, he presents 
evidence that competitive districts have large differences in voting between Democrats 
and Republicans who replace each other in the district (Fiorina 1974, p. 103).  
The problem with this argument is that Fiorina’s model is uni-dimensional. He 
argues that because members of Congress cannot predict what issues will come to the 
floor for a vote in the future, they vote on each issue without regard to how they will vote 
on other issues (Fiorina 1974). However, Congressional elections may not be uni-
dimensional. The constituency may care about more than one issue and these multiple 
issues may not reduce to a coherent, ideological, single dimension. As I will argue in this 
chapter, conflict on one dimension is not sufficient to induce candidate divergence. While 
there may be conflict on one issue in the constituency, I argue that if there is no conflict 
on other issues in the constituency the legislator will vote with the median voter and we 
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will not see candidate divergence. Without understanding the promises legislators make 
in the multi-dimensional setting of an election, we cannot predict how legislators will 
vote in the uni-dimensional setting of a vote in Congress.  
Fenno (1978) also argues that the composition of the district can affect how a 
candidate cultivates her election constituency. Fenno cites a legislator who said his 
heterogeneous district “gives [him] a chance to balance interests in [his] votes. There 
really aren’t any dominant interests” (Fenno 1978, p. 156). Based on the evidence from 
his 18 legislators, a major theme in Fenno’s book is that the composition of the district is 
a determinant of legislators’ “homestyle”. He argues that heterogeneity provides 
candidates flexibility in how they present themselves to their district. He tentatively 
defines heterogeneity as a combination of the number of and the compatibility of 
significant interests in the district (Fenno 1978, p. 4). However, given the nature of his 
data, Fenno does not systematically test the effect of heterogeneity on legislators’ 
behavior in the district.  
Other scholars have more directly tested the relationship between heterogeneity 
and candidate divergence. Gerber and Lewis (2004) find that heterogeneous districts have 
legislators who diverge more from the median voter than homogeneous districts. They 
test the effect of heterogeneity with unique data on voter preferences using Los Angeles 
county voter ballots on propositions and partisan candidates. Goff and Grier (1993) argue 
that heterogeneity should increase divergence based on theoretical results, derived by 
Miller (1980) and McKelvey (1986), that find that the size of the uncovered set, a 
solution set for multi-dimensional policy spaces, increases as voter heterogeneity 
increases. They analyze the difference in same-state Senators’ voting and find that 
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Senators from heterogeneous states, as measured by state demographic diversity, are 
more likely to diverge from each other than Senators from homogeneous states. However, 
Goff and Grier find inconsistent results across different types of diversity. The skew of 
the income distribution and a Herfindahl index based on occupation have a significant 
relationship with Senator divergence; the variance of income and a Herfindahl index 
based on ethnicity have no significant relationship to Senator divergence (Goff and Grier 
1993, pp. 16-17). Goff and Grier do not propose an explanation for why certain types of 
demographic diversity lead to divergence while other types do not. 
Sullivan (1973) looks at the relationship between demographic diversity and 
political competition in the states. According to Fiorina, heterogeneity in the district, 
because it allows candidates to cultivate different election constituencies, should also lead 
to political competition. Sullivan finds greater partisan competition in more diverse states 
(Sullivan 1973, p. 76). However, he also finds that racial diversity in the state leads to the 
opposite result – lower political competition (Sullivan 1973, p. 84). As with Goff and 
Grier, Sullivan does not suggest why certain types of demographic diversity lead to 
political competition while other types do not. 
Clearly, demographic diversity is a blunt instrument to measure heterogeneity. 
However, it highlights an important theoretical distinction – politically exploitable 
heterogeneity versus politically non-exploitable heterogeneity. Certain types of diversity 
may lead to politically exploitable heterogeneity while other types may not. When 
diversity leads to the two components mentioned above – disagreement over positions 
and disagreement over priorities – we should find politically exploitable heterogeneity in 
the district. For example, racial diversity may lead to disagreement over preferences but it 
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may also lead to an agreement on priorities. Key (1949) found that the larger the minority 
population in the South, the more conservative whites were on racial issues. This would 
lead to greater disagreement on racial issues in the district. It is also plausible that racial 
diversity increased the importance of the issue of race for both whites and blacks. As I 
will argue in this chapter, despite whites and blacks disagreeing on their position on 
racial policy, if they agree that racial policy is the top priority we will not see divergence 
between candidates from districts with this type of demographic diversity. By defining 
politically exploitable heterogeneity with theoretical concepts, as I do in this chapter, we 
can understand when we should expect demographic heterogeneity to lead to candidate 
divergence and when we should expect it not to.   
To clarify the distinction between my theory and current work, I refer to Figure 
3.1, a diagram of the relationship between demographic heterogeneity and candidate 
divergence. Most work tests the link between demographic heterogeneity and candidate 
divergence, as represented by the middle portion of the diagram (path 1), and finds 
inconsistent results. I argue that is because demographic heterogeneity can lead to 
politically exploitable heterogeneity (PEH) and politically non-exploitable heterogeneity. 
PEH is represented in the upper portion of the diagram (path 2) and occurs when 
demographic heterogeneity leads to disagreement on both issue priorities and positions. If 
demographic leads to PEH, then demographic heterogeneity should also lead to candidate 
divergence (path 3). However, demographic heterogeneity can also lead to politically 
non-exploitable heterogeneity, which is represented in the lower portion of the diagram 
(path 4). This occurs when demographic heterogeneity leads to either disagreement on 
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priorities or disagreement on positions, but not both. In this case, demographic 
heterogeneity should not lead to candidate divergence (path 5).  
 










In the example of racial issues, I argue that racial diversity could lead to 
politically non-exploitable heterogeneity because the presence of racial diversity could 
lead to a disagreement on position, as blacks and whites may disagree on their positions 
on the issue but also an agreement on priorities, meaning the issue of race becomes the 
prominent issue in the district. In this case, we are unlikely to get candidate divergence. 
This example and the diagram help to highlight the difference between my theory and 
Fiorina (1974). Fiorina argues that when there is conflict on position and agreement on 
priority (path 3), candidates will diverge in their position. My argument is that this should 
not lead to candidate divergence. Only when there is disagreement on both priorities and 
position (path 2) should we get candidate divergence. Fiorina, on the other hand, would 















candidate divergence. As mentioned earlier, this is driven by his assumption that votes in 
Congress are uni-dimensional, in that members of Congress do not consider their votes 
on other issues when voting on the issue at hand. Fiorina would argue that when 
constituents disagree on priorities, legislators always vote with the constituency that cares 
more about the issue, regardless of the positions of the constituency on other issues. 
 In the next sections, I explain in detail my theory of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity. 
 
3.2 Part 1: Cultivating an Election Constituency 
My theory is based on two basic assumptions about candidates’ motivations as 
well as a model of how Congressional candidates campaign for office. First, I assume that 
candidates are motivated primarily by winning election (Mayhew 1974, Fiorina 1974). In 
order to win the election, candidates need to put together a winning coalition of groups 
within the constituency (Fenno 1978). Second, I assume that candidates are also 
motivated by policy, but will prioritize winning over implementing their ideal policy 
position because without gaining office, candidates cannot pursue policy (Osborne 1995). 
The candidates’ pursuit of their personal preferences is constrained by needing to form a 
winning coalition. 
As for the model of campaigning, candidates build a winning coalition, or an 
election constituency, by becoming familiar with the constituency through traveling and 
meeting with groups in the district. By first understanding the district and the 
composition of interests within the district, the candidate can then cultivate groups within 
the constituency for their election coalition (Fenno 1978). Fenno (1978) provides a 
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detailed portrait of how candidates learn about their district and form their election 
constituencies. 
If candidates can choose which groups to include in their winning coalition, I 
argue they will want to include those groups with whom they agree. By including groups 
in their winning coalition who agree with the candidates’ policy positions, candidates 
cultivate support in their district for voting their preferences in office. However, if 
candidates are constrained in which groups must be part of their election constituency, 
candidates will cultivate the groups they need to win office and not vote against these 
groups’ wishes in office, whether or not these positions coincide with the candidates’ 
preferences (Kingdon 1989, Fiorina 1974). Obviously, it is unlikely that the candidates’ 
preferences and the winning coalition’s preferences deviate too often, otherwise the 
candidate made a poor choice in which district to run for office (Kingdon 1989). 
However, given that candidates may not agree with the median voter in their district on 
everything, the question of the dissertation is when do legislators get to choose which 
preference groups are part of their electoral coalition? 
 
3.3 Part II: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Flexibility 
 To discuss how politically exploitable heterogeneity leads to candidate 







3.3.1 Formal Model of Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Divergence 
Spatial modeling is useful for isolating the effect of conditions by providing 
precise expectations about the results of modifying certain conditions of a theory while 
holding other conditions constant. While some of the assumptions may be unrealistic, the 
usefulness of spatial modeling is in generating clear predictions that can guide 
measurement and tests. The key for our purpose is to look for which combination of 
conditions does not produce a single dominant position. If, given certain assumptions and 
conditions, it is possible to find a single dominant position, it is unlikely that candidates 
will have the flexibility to create different election constituencies and diverge in their 
Congressional behavior. Below, I first describe the basic multi-dimensional model of 
electoral competition. Second, I describe the conditions I modify that represent politically 
exploitable heterogeneity in the district and how modifying these conditions in the basic 
model can lead to candidate divergence. 
 
3.3.1.1 The Basic Model 
To begin, I lay out the assumptions of the basic electoral competition model.
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There are two candidates that compete in a single-round election that chooses one 
candidate. The election is decided by a single constituency and by a plurality of that 
constituency. Voters are not forward-looking, all voters participate, and they vote based 
on policies, represented by multiple dimensions, M. Voters act as if they have a preferred 
position on each dimension. The set of citizen i's preferences on M issues is represented 
by the vector 
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where Xi,1 is individual i's preference on issue 1, etc. The full multivariate 
distribution of voters’ preferences is obtained by identifying the percentage of voters who 
prefer a particular point.  We also assume that the distribution is a radially symmetric 
continuous distribution, causing the median to also be the mean on the issue. 
Candidates are also not forward-looking, they care primarily about winning
6
, and 
they can accurately identify the location of the median voter. The candidates’ positions 
are well defined on the same continuous dimensions as the voters’ positions and are 
known by each voter. Finally, the candidates have perfect spatial mobility. Candidate A’s 




























The candidate would like to be able to choose the position that is the preferred 
position for each voter, but that is unlikely to be possible. Instead, the candidate wants to 
pick the set of positions that will maximize her probability of getting a plurality of the 
votes. This probability is determined by the voters’ utility loss associated with the 
candidate. The loss function is  
                                                
6
 Davis Hinich and Ordeshook (1970) note that while candidates may be motivated by other incentives, 
such as policy or benefits from political activity, “winning, at the very least, is instrumental for realizing 
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where A + "
i
 is the matrix of weights voters assign to the M dimensions. A is the 
average of weights assigned to the M dimensions and "
i
 represents the individual 
deviations in weights from A. We assume that the weight on a given issue is uncorrelated 
with the position a citizen prefers, meaning that "
i
 and Xi are uncorrelated. 
 
3.3.1.2 Modifying the Basic Model 
To analyze how politically exploitable heterogeneity (PEH) modifies the above 
basic model to allow for candidate divergence, we need to first define PEH. There are 
two aspects to a voter’s attitude – position and priority (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). 
Position is where the voter stands on the issue. Do they want more or less spending on 
social welfare? How much regulation of financial markets do they want? Priority is how 
salient the issue is to the voter, meaning how important is the issue relative to other issues 
that are part of the voter’s voting calculus. These aspects of attitudes, position and 
priority, lead to two components of heterogeneity within the district: position 
disagreement and priority disagreement. Position disagreement is the amount that voters 
disagree on the position they prefer on an issue. Priority disagreement is the amount that 
voters disagree on the priority they place on an issue relative to other issues.  
This definition of the components of attitude heterogeneity leads us to examine 
the modification of two conditions in the model - disagreement in the district over issue 
positions and disagreement in the district over issue priorities. These conditions 
correspond to two important components of a spatial model that might affect whether we 
expect there to be a single dominant position for candidates. The first component is the 
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distribution of preferences on the dimensions. The two types of distributions that are 
relevant are unimodal and bimodal. The distribution of preferences corresponds with 
whether there is disagreement over policy positions in the district. A unimodal 
distribution represents a constituency that agrees on their preference on an issue. As the 
distribution becomes more bimodal this represents a constituency that is increasingly 
divided on an issue. The second component is how voters weigh each issue in their 
evaluation of candidates. This component represents whether voters agree on their issue 
priorities. If the weight is the same across all voters, then voters agree on their issue 
priorities. The greater the differences in the weight voters assign to different issues, the 
more voters disagree on their issue priorities. 
These two components lead to four interesting situations. First, voters agree on 
their priorities and their positions, meaning they have the same weights on each issue and 
the distribution of preferences is unimodal. Second, voters agree on their priorities but 
disagree on their positions, meaning they have the same weights on each issue and the 
distribution of preferences is bimodal. Third, voters disagree on their priorities but agree 
on their positions, meaning they have different weights on each issue and the distribution 
of preferences is unimodal. Finally, voters disagree on their priorities and disagree on 
their positions, meaning they have different weights on each issue and the distribution of 
preferences is bimodal. In this final situation, because voters disagree on both priorities 
and position, voters’ weight on an issue and voters’ position on the issue will be 
correlated. This means that those who think an issue is important will have a different 
opinion than those who think the issue is unimportant. While I discuss four discrete 
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situations here, disagreement among voters on priorities and positions is a matter of 
degree.  
The basic model assumes that all voters have the same relative weighting of the 
different dimensions. Given the assumptions of the basic model, candidates should 
converge to the median-like point (DHO 1970). This holds for whether the distribution of 
the electorate’s preferences is unimodal or bimodal. This means that when voters agree 
on their priorities, regardless of whether they agree or disagree on their positions, the 
median-like point is the stable equilibrium point for candidates and we should not see 
candidate divergence. 
When voters disagree on the relative weights assigned to issues but agree on their 
positions, the median-like point is still the dominant position for candidates. In this 
situation, where voters disagree on priority but agree on preferences, the assumption that 
voters’ weights and positions are uncorrelated is still valid. Jackson (1973) provides the 
proof that the assumptions of radially symmetric distributions and uncorrelated weights 
and positions satisfy Plott’s (1967) conditions for finding a stable equilibrium point in a 
multidimensional space. Plott (1967) provides two necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a stable equilibrium point to exist. First, the stable point must coincide with at least one 
person’s preference on every issue. Second, there must be an equal number of voters on 
each side of the stable point, meaning that for every Xi, there must be an individual Xj, 
where Xj = -Xi, who would prefer the median to all other points. The assumption that the 
distribution is symmetric satisfies the first condition that there is at least one voter at the 
stable point. This assumption also ensures that there are diametrically opposed points, 
meaning an equal number of voters on each side of the stable point. Finally the 
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assumption that the weights and positions are uncorrelated ensures that voters prefer the 
median to all other proposals. For the proof, see Jackson (1973). 
Finally, the interesting modification for my theory is when voters disagree on 
position and priority. In this case, the weights and positions are now correlated and 
Plott’s second condition for finding a stable point is violated. Under these circumstances, 
since we do not have a stable equilibrium point, we will see the potential for candidate 
divergence. The direction of this cycling will be between the median and the direction of 
the correlation of the weights and the positions. For the proof, see Jackson (1973). 
In the next section, I provide a concrete example of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity and the potential for candidate divergence. 
 
3.3.2 Example of Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Divergence 
To illustrate my definition of and the effects of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity, I rely on a simple example of a policy space where there are two potential 
issues voters in a district may use as part of their voting calculus – defense spending and 
abortion. There are three potential positions on each issue a voter may choose. For 
defense spending, the positions are more spending, no change in spending, or less 
spending. For abortion, the positions are ban abortion, allow abortion in cases of rape and 
incest, or allow abortion in all cases. The examples lay out preferences for three voters 
(A, B, and C) in the district. For these examples, I assume that the voters have equal 
weight in the district, thereby representing groups of equal numbers, and that the voters 
have fixed preferences, meaning they are not changed by framing effects or other 
campaign tactics. The number of issues that voters use to evaluate the candidates, the 
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policy preferences of voters A, B, and C, and the voters’ relative issue priorities for four 
different types of districts are outlined in Table 3.1. The issues included in the rows for 
each district are the issues that are relevant to the voters’ voting calculus.  Bolded 
preferences indicate that one issue in a voter’s voting calculus is relatively more 
important to the voter than the other issue in his voting calculus. When a district includes 
both issues, this indicates that both issues are relevant for the voter’s choice between the 
candidates but the bolded issue holds more weight in the voter’s decision. 
Table 3.1 Four Types of Districts 
District A Priority Agreement, Position Agreement (hereafter RAOA) 
Issue(s) Voter A Voter B Voter C 
Defense Spending - Increase Spending - Increase Spending 
 
- Increase Spending 
Abortion - Allow Abortion 
 
- Allow Abortion - Allow Abortion 
  
District B Priority Agreement, Position Disagreement (hereafter RAOD) 
Issue(s) Voter A Voter B Voter C 




Abortion - Ban Abortion - Allow Abortion in 
Case of Rape, Incest 
- Allow Abortion 
  
District C Priority Disagreement, Position Agreement (hereafter RDOA) 
Issue(s) Voter A Voter B Voter C 
Defense Spending - Increase Spending 
 
- Increase Spending - Increase Spending 
Abortion - Allow Abortion 
 
- Allow Abortion - Allow Abortion 
 
District D Priority Disagreement, Position Disagreement (hereafter RDOD) 
Issue(s) Voter A Voter B Voter C 
Defense Spending - Increase Spending - No Change in 
Spending 
- Decrease Spending 
Abortion - Ban Abortion - Allow Abortion in 
Case of Rape, Incest 
- Allow Abortion 
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As outlined in section 3.1, districts come in four ideal forms. First, the district can 
agree on the issue priorities and agree on the policy solutions. This is illustrated in district 
A (RAOA), where voters agree defense spending is the most important issue and 
everyone agrees there should be increased spending. Second, the district can agree on 
issue priorities but disagree on the policy solutions. This is illustrated in district B 
(RAOD), where voters agree defense spending is the most important issue but all three 
voters disagree on the policy solution. Third, the district can disagree on which issue is 
relatively more important but agree on the policy solutions. This is illustrated in district C 
(RDOA), where everyone agrees that there should be increased spending on defense and 
abortion should be allowed, but Voter A thinks defense spending is more important, 
Voter C thinks abortion is more important, and Voter B thinks both issues are equally 
important.  
Finally, the district can disagree on which issue is relatively more important and 
disagree on the policy solution to the issues. This is illustrated in district D (RDOD), 
where Voter A thinks defense spending is more important, Voter B thinks both issues are 
equally important, and Voter C thinks abortion is more important and all three voters 
disagree on the policy solutions to defense spending and abortion. In this situation, the 
district has what I label “intense preference minorities.” These are groups (here one 
voter) in the district who prefer a particular policy solution to the issue and think the issue 
is more important than other issues that the district is concerned about. The key point 
about these intense preference minorities is that, given the structure of their preferences, 
they are willing to trade an undesirable policy position on issues they care less about for 
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the desirable policy position on issues they care more about (Jackson 1973, Tversky 
1972).  
Now that we have defined politically exploitable heterogeneity, we can identify 
which districts require candidates to choose the same winning coalition and which 
districts allow candidates to choose different winning coalitions. If there is only one 
policy position a candidate can choose to win in the district, there is a dominant winning 
position in the district. However, if there are multiple policy positions that a candidate 
can choose to win in the district, there is no dominant winning position. It is in this 
district where there is no dominant winning position that there is politically exploitable 
heterogeneity.  In this district, candidates can manipulate the available heterogeneity to 
create a winning coalition of their choice.  
To identify why certain districts have a single dominant position and why some 
do not, I rely on the formal results described earlier. Districts A (RAOA) and B (RAOD) 
in table 3.1 are examples of the multi-dimensional policy space with different preference 
distributions. In these districts, the median voter should be a strong determinant of 
Congressional voting and we should find little candidate divergence on the issue of 
importance – defense spending. For district A (RAOA) this means all candidates will 
vote for increased defense spending in Congress. For district B (RAOD), all candidates 
will vote for no change in defense spending in Congress. District C (RDOA) also, 
obviously, has a dominant winning position for candidates, which is the position on 
which all voters agree.  
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Since districts A and B do not care about the issue of abortion, we can expect to 
see divergence between candidates on the issue of abortion in these districts (Kingdon 
1989). The finding that members of Congress are unconstrained by their district on issues 
the district cannot be made to care about is prevalent in the legislative behavior literature 
(Kingdon 1989, Arnold 1990). However, the explanation that legislators only diverge on 
issues their constituency does not consider important is both theoretically uninteresting 
and empirically inaccurate. For example, in Chapter 2, gender differences in voting 
behavior emerged on publicly important issues such as partial-birth abortions and public 
funding for education. It is divergence on important issues that is truly puzzling given our 
understanding of Congressional behavior and, I argue, can be explained by the presence 
of politically exploitable heterogeneity. 
District D (RDOD) is different from the other districts. Importantly, in this 
district, candidates can choose more than one position that is a winning position. This is 
because voters both disagree on positions and priorities (Jackson 1973). To illustrate this, 
I outline candidate strategies in table 3.3 for district D (RDOD).  As a reminder, I also 
reproduce in table 3.2 the district’s distribution of preferences and priorities. 
Table 3.3 includes the candidate positions, voter choices, and winning outcomes 
of a three period game. In each period, two candidates compete to win the election by 
placing themselves at the median on both issues (the Median Candidate), the extreme on 
both issues (the Non-Median Candidate), or at the median on one issue and the extreme 
on the other issue (the Semi-Median Candidate).
7
 In each period, the voters choose 
between the candidates and vote for the candidate that provides lower utility loss. Voter 
A and Voter C choose a candidate based on both defense spending and abortion but 
                                                
7
 This naming comes from Jackson 1973. 
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weight the candidates’ position on their prioritized issue more heavily (defense spending 
for Voter A and abortion for Voter C; Voter B weights both issues equally) (Tversky 
1972). Column 1 indicates in which election period the candidates are running and the 
name of the candidates running. Column 2 identifies the candidates’ positions on both 
issues. Column 3 identifies which voters each candidate would win given their policy 
position. Whichever candidate wins two voters wins the election and becomes the 
incumbent in the next period. As incumbent, the candidate is frozen at the positions she 
chose in the last period. For exposition, it is easiest to discuss this cycling in terms of 
different election periods. However, this cycling does not have to occur over time and 
could occur in one election period where candidates are free to move positions. 
 
 
Table 3.2 District D (RDOD): Multiple Issues, Position Disagreement, Priority 
Disagreement District 
Issue(s) Voter A Voter B Voter C 
Defense Spending - Increase 
Spending 
- No Change in 
Spending 
- Decrease Spending 
Abortion - Ban Abortion - Allow Abortion in 
Case of Rape, Incest 




Table 3.3 Cycling of Candidate Position in PEH District 




- No Change in Spending 
- Allow Abortion in Case of 
Rape, Incest 
Voter B 
Non-Median Candidate - Increase Spending 
- Allow Abortion 
 




- Increase Spending 
- Allow Abortion 
 
Voter C 
Semi-Median Candidate - Increase Spending 
- Allow Abortion in Case of 
Rape, Incest 




- Increase Spending 
- Allow Abortion in Case of 
Rape, Incest 
Voter A 
Median Candidate - No Change in Spending 
- Allow Abortion in Case of 
Rape, Incest 
Voter B, Voter C 
 
 
In election 1, if one candidate positions herself at the median voter on both issues, 
she can be beat by a candidate who places herself at a non-median position on both 
issues, given that the Non-Median Candidate chooses the positions that are preferred by 
the intense preference minorities. The Median Candidate would win Voter B’s vote. The 
Non-Median Candidate who offers increased defense spending (Voter A’s position on his 
prioritized issue) and allowing abortion (Voter C’s position on his prioritized issue) will 
win Voter A and Voter C’s votes and win the election.  
However, the Non-Median Candidate is not immune to a challenger. In election 2, 
another candidate, the Semi-Median Candidate, can propose to be at the non-median 
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position on defense spending and to be at the median position on abortion. Voter C will 
still vote with the Non-Median Candidate because she offers him his preferred position 
on his prioritized issue, abortion. Voter B will vote with the Semi-Median Candidate 
because she offers him his preferred position on abortion and he has no choice on defense 
spending, since both candidates offer increased defense spending. Voter A will also vote 
for the Semi-Median Candidate because she offers him his preferred position on his 
prioritized issue, defense spending, and is closer to him on abortion than the Non-Median 
Candidate. By voting with the Semi-Median Candidate, Voter A has to give up less on 
the abortion issue while still getting his ideal position on defense spending. The Semi-
Median Candidate beats the Non-Median Candidate. 
However, the Semi-Median Candidate is also not immune to a challenger. In 
election 3, a challenger can offer the median position, which is Voter B’s ideal policy 
position on both defense spending and abortion. Voter A will still vote with the Semi-
Median Candidate because she offers him his ideal position on defense spending and 
there is no difference between the Semi-Median Candidate and the Median Candidate on 
abortion. Voter B will vote for the Median Candidate because she offers his ideal position 
on both issues. Voter C will also vote for the Median Candidate because she offers policy 
positions closer to his ideal position on defense spending than the Semi-Median 
Candidate and there is no difference between the candidates on abortion. Voter C has no 
option of voting for a candidate that provides him with his ideal position on his 
prioritized issue, abortion. The Median Candidate wins.  
As outlined above, though, a challenger at the non-median position can then 
challenge and beat the Median Candidate. And so the cycling continues between the three 
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winning positions. What this means is that candidates can choose any of the above 
positions – median, semi-median, and non-median – and have a chance at winning the 
election. I argue that candidates, in this situation, will choose the position that most 
closely matches their ideal preferences and, by doing so, create an election coalition that 
supports voting their ideal preferences in Congress. However, this election coalition will 
be unstable and open to challenges. In summary, we should find candidate divergence 
only in districts that have both components of heterogeneity: voters disagree on the 
policy solutions to issues and voters disagree on which issue is a top priority. 
The most interesting comparison is between the results of candidate positioning in 
district B (RAOD) versus district D (RDOD). Both districts have the same median voter 
on both issues – no change in defense spending and allow abortion in the case of rape and 
incest. However, district D (RDOD), because of the difference in priorities, allows 
candidates to choose which winning coalition they cultivate while district B (RAOD) has 
a single dominant position at the median on both issues. This is the key part of the 
argument. Despite both districts having the exact same median voter, district B (RAOD) 
should lead legislators to converge in their Congressional voting while district D (RDOD) 
allows legislators to diverge in their Congressional voting.  
 
3.4 Tying it all together: Election Constituencies, Politically Exploitable 
Heterogeneity, and Candidate Divergence in Congress 
 Finally, we can bring the two parts of the theory together – one, candidates want 
to form electoral coalitions consistent with their policy preferences and two, certain types 
of heterogeneous districts allow candidates flexibility in choosing which groups will be 
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part of their election coalition. Candidates must form a winning electoral constituency to 
win office. If candidates have the flexibility to create a different winning coalition than 
other candidates, they will form a constituency that supports their policy preferences. 
This flexibility arises in districts where there are intense preference minorities willing to 
trade a position on other issues to get their preferred position on the issue they care about 
most. The flexibility in creating a coalition translates into flexibility in Congress. If a 
candidate can form a coalition consistent with her preferences, she can then vote her 
preferences in Congress.  However, if a candidate is constrained in choosing a certain 
composition of a coalition in the district, the candidate will follow the preferences of her 
election constituency. This constraint will occur in districts where there are no intense 
preference minorities. In these districts, we will not see a difference between candidates 
from the same party with similar district medians. 
The specific puzzle of the dissertation is the systematic gender gap in legislative 
voting between legislators from the same party and similar districts. The important first 
step of the argument is that legislators have policy preferences they want to pursue in 
office.  Chapter 4 provides detailed evidence of a gender gap in attitudes, both at the mass 
public and elite levels. Given these differences, I expect female candidates will want to 
pursue different policy preferences in office than men. Therefore, as argued in my 
general theory of candidate divergence outlined in this chapter, these policy preferences 
should guide women’s choice of winning coalitions in the district. This choice will be 
constrained by whether there is politically exploitable heterogeneity within the district on 
the issues where women differ from men in their policy preferences.  
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There are two important caveats to the effect of politically exploitable heterogeneity 
on the divergence between men and women. First, if the district does not care about 
women’s issues, we will see divergence regardless of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity. Second, if the district does care about women’s issues, we will only see 
divergence if there is PEH in the district on women’s issues. Otherwise, if PEH exists in 
the district on other issues where there is no gender gap in preference, then we should see 
no divergence. The hypotheses derived from my theory are outlined below. 
 
Hypothesis 1. If the district is not concerned about women’s issues, there will be a 
gender gap in Congressional behavior, regardless of the level of heterogeneity. 
 
Hypothesis 2. If the district either disagrees on positions or priorities, but not both, 
there will be no gender gap in Congressional behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 3. If the district disagrees on position and disagrees on priorities, 
including issues where there is a gender gap in attitudes, there will be a gender gap in 




My theory presented in this chapter argues that politically exploitable 
heterogeneity in the district allows legislators to pursue their policy preferences in office 
and therefore we should find a gender gap among legislators from these types of districts. 
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While my theory is applied specifically to the gender gap in voting in Congress, it has 
implications for other aspects of Congressional behavior, for candidates’ behavior during 
campaigns, and for citizens’ voting behavior. Most obviously, since the theory is 
articulated in general terms about legislators following policy preferences, it should apply 
to other groups in Congress that differ in their policy preferences. The presence of 
politically exploitable heterogeneity should affect whether legislators of different 
ethnicities, from different class backgrounds, or of different religions converge or diverge 
in their voting in Congress. In addition, the theory should help to explain differences in 
legislators’ agendas, meaning on what issues they introduce bills and the content of those 
bills. Just as legislators from districts with politically exploitable heterogeneity should be 
able to follow their preferences in voting on the House floor, legislators from these types 
of districts should also be able to follow their preferences in their bill introductions (Hall, 
1996).  
Beyond behavior in Congress, my theory has implications for candidates’ 
behavior during campaigns. The presence of politically exploitable heterogeneity in the 
district should affect both what issues candidates focus on and to whom candidates make 
appeals. The major implication of my argument is that candidates will vary which groups 
they appeal to based on the potential in the district for the candidate to put together a 
winning coalition that is consistent with the candidate’s preferences. In districts that do 
not have politically exploitable heterogeneity, there is no room for candidates to choose 
among possible groups for their winning coalition. Therefore, across more homogeneous 
districts with the same median voter and the same set of important issues, we should 
expect candidates’ campaign issues and positions to be similar. However, in districts that 
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have politically exploitable heterogeneity, candidates should have more freedom to focus 
on the issues and positions that the candidates care about. We should find that, despite 
having similar median voters, two districts may differ drastically in what issues are 
discussed and which positions the candidates take during the campaign based on the level 
of politically exploitable heterogeneity present.  
Finally, the theory may have interesting implications for vote choice. Depending 
on the composition of the district, candidates should either diverge or converge in their 
policy platforms. I expect that in districts with intense preference minorities we will see 
differences between male and female candidates on the issues and positions they address 
during the campaign. In districts that are more homogeneous, this gender difference in 
campaign platforms should not appear. Differences in platforms may have implications 
for which voters will vote for a female candidate. Among more homogeneous districts, 
where there will be no difference between male and female candidates’ platforms, we 
should also find no difference in whether male or female voters vote for a female 
candidate. However, among districts with politically exploitable heterogeneity, female 
candidates may have the flexibility to emphasize issues where there is a gender gap in 
policy preferences in a way that is different from a male candidate. In these types of 
districts, we might find a gender gap in voting for a female candidate. Because of the 
female candidate’s emphasis on issues important to women, women may be more likely 
to vote for the female candidate and possibly cross party lines in their voting then they 
would if the same party’s candidate were male. 
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While in this dissertation I apply my theory of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity to the specific question of gender differences in Congressional voting, the 
theory has implications for a broad range of important topics in political science.
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Chapter 4  
   The Gender Gap in Attitudes Among Elites 
 
A key component of the theory of politically exploitable heterogeneity is that 
candidates have policy preferences they would like to pursue in office and will create 
election coalitions based on these preferences when possible. For this theory to explain 
gender divergence in Congress we must be able to assume there is a gender gap in 
preferences between male and female legislators. In this chapter, I review the evidence of 
a gender gap among legislators and present results that suggest we can assume that 
politically elite men and women differ in their policy preferences. First, I review the 
evidence of a gender gap in attitudes and present arguments on both sides of whether we 
should expect a gender gap to emerge among political elites. Second, I discuss my two 
approaches to assessing whether a gender gap in attitudes exists among political elites – 
using the 1992 Convention Delegates Study and the 1992-2000 American National 
Election Study surveys. Third, I present my results from the two surveys. Finally, I 
discuss my findings that the gender gap persists among political elites, especially on 
issues of social welfare, where there is a gender gap among non-elites, and emerges on 
moral issues where there is not. 
 
4.1 Evidence of a Gender Gap in Attitudes 
There is strong evidence that men and women in the mass public have different 
policy preferences on a range of issues. Women are found to be considerably more liberal 
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than men on areas of government involvement in ensuring employment and government 
spending on social services generally (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Shapiro and 
Mahajan 1986; Poole and Ziegler 1985; Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Iversen and 
Rosenbluth 2006). In addition, some studies find a major difference between men and 
women on the advocacy of civil rights and anti-discrimination against minorities (Shapiro 
and Mahajan 1986; Norrander 1999a in Hutchings et al 2004; Kaufman and Petrocik 
1999). Finally, some find significant differences over time on the use of force, with 
women much less likely to support the use of force at home and abroad (Shapiro and 
Mahajan 1986). Surprisingly, a gender gap on issues relating directly to women, whether 
it is the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), women’s roles in society, or abortion, has not 
appeared (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Hutchings et al 2004; Chaney, Alvarez, and 
Nagler 1998).  
The evidence of a gender gap in preferences among legislators is less plentiful. 
Thomas and Welch (1991) found that male and female legislators differed in their 
legislative priorities. Female legislators were more likely than men to name women, 
children and the family, the environment, and welfare as their areas of priority. Dodson 
(2001) found that women were more likely than men to express attitudinal support for 
feminist causes among both self-declared feminists and non-feminists.  
The most glaring problem with depending on this type of evidence of gender 
differences in attitudes among legislators is that the reasoning is circular. We expect that 
male and female legislators will behave differently in the legislature because of their 
different policy preferences; we know that male and female legislators have different 
policy preferences because they behave differently in the legislature. Besides the problem 
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of these actions being on both the right-hand-side and left-hand-side of the model, the 
actions and expressed attitudes of a legislator are tainted by too many other influences 
(constituency, party, interest groups) to be reliable indicators of the legislator’s personal 
preferences. However, it is difficult to find direct measures of legislators’ personal 
preferences.  
One option is to assume that the gender gap among elites will mirror the gender 
gap among the mass public. Believing this assumption, though, depends on which 
explanation for the gender gap is correct. There are three major explanations for why and 
on what issues a gender gap in policy attitudes will emerge: the socialization of women, 
the feminist identity of women, and women’s self-interest.  
The socialization explanation argues that men and women are socialized 
differently. Women are raised to relate to others and have both care and concern for the 
well-being of others (Gilligan 1982). Men, on the other hand, are taught to focus more on 
individuality and the needs of their own family. Given this socialization, women are 
expected to be more liberal on “compassion” issues than men, such as spending on the 
poor, the elderly, and children and the needs of minority groups (Hutchings et al 2004; 
Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).  
A second explanation for the gender gap is that as women become more closely 
identified with the feminist movement, there will be a larger gender gap on issues that 
relate to women. This expectation is consistent with Converse’s research on belief 
systems. Belief systems that are centered on a group, such as blacks, exhibit high 
constraint among issues that are directly related to the group (Converse 1964). Conover 
(1988) found some evidence that the gender gap was mainly due to different preferences 
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among feminist women. Cook and Wilcox (1991) also find that women who express 
greater support for feminism also tend to be more liberal. 
A final explanation for differences based on gender is self-interest. This 
explanation comes in two versions. The first is that women are more likely than men to 
be poor or to face the prospect of poverty. They are also more likely to live longer than 
men and to have to care for children on their own (Piven 1985; Iversen and Rosenbluth 
2006). Because of these realities, women are expected to support greater government 
spending on the social safety net. The second version of the self-interest argument comes 
from a recent article by Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006). They argue that the explanation 
that women are more likely to be economically vulnerable is not sufficient to explain the 
gender gap on social welfare. Iversen and Rosenbluth cite evidence that even women who 
are financially secure, in terms of income, are more likely than men in their same 
situation to support greater public investment in social welfare (Iversen and Rosenbluth 
2006). They argue, instead, that women desire government involvement in childcare, 
caring for the elderly, and health care, among other things, because this relieves women 
of some of the large amount of unpaid work they do within the home. In this way, women 
gain stronger bargaining power within the home over the division of labor, such as who 
will work and how much. This bargaining power is relevant in countries where divorce is 
likely and women must prepare themselves economically for the possibility of the 
dissolution of their marriage. Iversen and Rosenbluth find strong evidence for their 
argument in a cross-national study (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). 
There are multiple reasons to expect the gender gap to persist among elites. If 
socialized compassion explains the gender gap, then we might expect the gender gap to 
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persist among elites. It is possible that gender socialization is similar across class lines. If 
feminism explains the gender gap, then the gender gap should exist among the political 
elite. In fact, the gender gap may be larger among the political elite than the non-elite. 
Those who are politically involved tend to be higher educated (Burns, Schlozman, and 
Verba 2001) and women with more education express stronger support for feminism 
(Warner 1991). Finally, if the self-interest explanation based on bargaining in the 
household over unpaid work explains gender differences in attitudes, we would expect 
politically elite women to also support a government safety net more than politically elite 
men.  
On the other hand, there are also strong reasons why we might expect the gender 
gap to disappear among the elite. In general, differences in income, education, and 
political involvement lead to differences in attitudes. Education can make you more 
liberal, higher income leads to more conservatism, and political involvement should lead 
your attitudes to be more consistently constrained. These differences based on education, 
income, and political involvement should affect women as well as men and might serve 
to lessen or eliminate the gender gap. Finally, if the explanation for the gender gap is self-
interest based on the fact that women tend to be poorer and have fewer resources then 
men, elite women may no longer differ from elite men. They would not be subjected to 
these types of experiences that would make them more liberal. In addition, while group 
identification among African-Americans leads to a racial attitude gap that crosses class 
lines (Dawson 1994), women are less likely to feel a common fate with other women that 
might lead to a gender gap regardless of class.  
 75 
 Given these convincing arguments on both sides of the existence of a gender gap 
among elites, it is unclear whether the gender gap will persist among the political elite. In 
addition, given evidence that all three explanations of the gender gap (socialization, 
feminism, self-interest) have some merit, it is not clear how the combination of these 
influences will affect politically elite women. The more appropriate question that remains 
unanswered then is on what issues does the gender gap emerge among the political elite?  
 
4.2 Testing for a Gender Gap among Elites 
To test for gender differences in attitudes among the political elite, I use two 
approaches, each with their advantages and disadvantages. First, I analyze the 1992 
Convention Delegates Study. This study surveyed the delegates to the Democratic and 
Republican conventions in 1992, asking questions about their background, career 
aspirations, and political attitudes. A clear advantage of using this survey is that attendees 
to these conventions are clearly political elites – they are more politically involved than 
most Americans and have more constrained belief systems than the mass public (Jennings 
1992). In addition, there is a long battery of attitude questions that cover important issue 
areas such as social welfare, health care, crime, and abortion. The disadvantage of this 
study is that is not correct to equate convention delegates with public office holders. 
Many of the convention delegates were not public office holders and many did not aspire 
to hold public office. In addition, I find clear attitude differences between those who 
aspire to political office among the delegates and those who do not. Those who held 
office or aspire to office are less extreme than those who do not. A second disadvantage 
is the survey is conducted in the context of the party convention. There are multiple 
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questions on the survey that ask about party support, commitment to party work, and how 
candidates affect the party’s ticket. With this emphasis on the party, there may be more 
conformity to the party’s platform than otherwise. This may approximate the pressures 
candidates are under when running for office or may obscure the freedom candidates 
have when forming their individual campaign in a particular district. 
The second approach I use is to analyze the cumulative American National 
Election Study surveys between 1992 and 2000, the time period during which I find the 
gender gap in Congress. The ANES includes questions on political participation that 
allow us to distinguish respondents who are part of the political elite. It is likely that these 
political elites are part of the pool of people recruited to run for office. In addition, the 
ANES allows for a direct comparison between the political elite and non-elite, as well as 
allows us to analyze more years than just 1992. The clear disadvantage of analyzing the 
ANES is that even the political elite among the mass public are not necessarily the same 
as the political elite involved in national politics. While there is clear differentiation in 
attitude structure among the mass public based on political participation, the attendees to 
the party conventions are still significantly attitudinally different from the most active of 
the mass public (Jennings 1992). By using these two different surveys, I hope to offset 
the disadvantages of each and to get a clearer picture of the elite gender gap than using 
only one survey would provide. 
In each dataset, I analyze the issue questions that are comparable between the two 
datasets. This includes a wide range of issues – government spending, federal spending 
on child care, federal spending on college, federal spending on public schools, federal 
spending on social security, federal spending on the poor, federal spending on welfare, 
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federal spending on the homeless, access to abortion, allowing school prayer, defense 
spending, government health insurance, federal spending on blacks, government 
assistance to blacks, equal gender roles, federal spending on the environment, and federal 
spending on crime. I coded each issue area such that the expected gender gap would lead 
to a positive difference between women and men. For example, spending on children and 
education is coded such that support for increased spending is at 1 and support for 
decreased spending is at 0. All variables run from 0 to 1. I consider a gap to be a 
difference of 5 percentage points or more that is statistically significant at the 95% level, 
consistent with other scholars (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). 
 
4.2.1 Analyzing the 1992 Convention Delegate Study  
Because one worry about the Convention Delegate Study is the difference 
between those who hold public office and those who are party advocates, I analyze the 
gender difference in attitude only for those who once held public office or who aspired to 
hold public office. The CDS asked two separate questions about public office. The first 
was whether the respondent ever held public office. I included anyone who said they 
currently held or held in the past a public position for national, state, or local office. The 
second was whether the delegate had any aspirations for public office. I included anyone 
who said yes to aspirations for public office at the national, state, or local level. As 
mentioned above, those who held or aspired to public office tend to be less extreme than 
the delegates who were uninterested in public office.  
Because party is so influential in Congress and is an indication of an individual’s 
core preferences, I analyze whether the gender difference arises within each party. 
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Because women are more likely to be Democrats than men, if we analyze the gender 
differences without respect to party, the results may be driven just by the fact that 
Democrats differ from Republicans. Instead, we are interested in whether, within each 
party, women differ from men. To identify the party of the delegates, I created a dummy 
variable for party with Republicans coded at 0 and Democrats coded at 1. 










Female #Dem + $  
Female is a dummy variable with men coded at 0 and women coded at 1. Dem is the 
dummy variable for party with Republicans coded at 0 and Democrats coded at 1. Female 
x Dem is the interaction of the two variables.  
 
4.2.2 Analyzing the 1992-2000 American National Election Studies 
To identify the political elite, I created a measure of political involvement from a 
respondent’s political participation, political interest, and political knowledge. Political 
participation is a combination of six questions in the ANES:  try to influence others’ vote 
choices, attend political meetings or rallies, work for a party or candidate, display a 
candidate button or sticker, and donate money to a party or candidate. I also included 
whether the respondent voted in the most recent general election. Political interest is a 
question of how much the respondent follows what’s going on in government and public 
affairs. The response options run from hardly at all to most of the time. The political 
knowledge variable is based on the interviewer’s observation of the respondent’s 
knowledge. The options run from very high to very low. I combined all four variables 
 79 
(participation, vote, interest, and knowledge) into one scale variable. I then designated as 
political elite the top 15 percent of this variable (Jennings 1992).  
The distinction between the political elite and the political non-elite is stark. The 
average level of participation among the top fifteen percent is 2.6 political acts and all 
voted, while the average level among the rest of the respondents is .4 political acts and 
“only” 60% voted. All of the political elites completed at least one act of participation, 
whereas 68% of the political non-elite completed no act. The average interest level of the 
political elites is .95, equivalent to saying “follow public affairs most of the time”, and 
the average knowledge level is .86, equivalent to somewhere between “fairly high” and 
“very high”. The average interest level among the political non-elites is .56, equivalent to 
somewhere between “follow public affairs now and then” and “some of the time”, and 
the average knowledge level is .48, equivalent to “average”.  
To make the analysis of gender differences using the NES comparable to the 
analysis of the CDS, I also analyze the gender difference by party. I look at Democrats 
and Republicans only. To identify Democrats and Republicans, I used the 7-point party 
identification variable. I coded as party identifiers partisan leaners, weak partisans, and 
strong partisans. The only category excluded from the analysis is pure independents. 
I estimate the following model using standard OLS for each policy opinion 









Female # PE + "
4$7Year + %  
Female is a dummy variable with men coded at 0 and women coded at 1. PE is the 
political elite dummy variable with the top 15 percent of political participants coded at 1 
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and everyone else coded at 0. Female x PE is the interaction of the two variables. Year 
represents dummy variables for each year of the survey, with 1992 as the reference. 
 
4.3 Results 
 The results are presented in tables 4.1 to 4.6 at the end of the chapter. First are the 
results for Democrats in the NES (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Second are the results for 
Republicans in the NES (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Third are the results for the CDS (Tables 
4.5 and 4.6). Also included is a graph of the gender differences for each issue area. The 
graph is the marginal effect of gender with 95% confidence intervals by party and by 
elite/non-elite for the NES and by party for the CDS. 
Among the political non-elites, I find a gender gap in areas that are mostly 
consistent with earlier studies of the gender gap in attitudes. Women are more liberal than 
men in areas of social welfare. They want more spending than men on services generally 
and specifically on child care, public schools, social security, welfare, the poor and the 
homeless. This gender gap holds for both Democrats and Republicans on social security 
and the homeless. Republicans are mostly driving the gender gap in other areas. I did not 
find gender differences overall or in either party on other issue areas – defense spending, 
government health care, government aid to blacks, women’s equal role, abortion, school 
prayer, or federal spending on college aid, crime, and the environment. 
Similar to non-elites, elites differ by gender over social welfare issues. In both the 
NES and the CDS, Democratic women are more liberal than Democratic men on 
spending on social security, child care, and the homeless; Republican women are more 
liberal than Republican men on spending on the homeless. In the NES only, Republican 
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women are also more liberal than Republican men on government health care and just 
miss the threshold on a gender difference on federal spending on public schools. In the 
CDS only, Democratic women are more liberal than Democratic men on government 
services spending generally and federal spending specifically on college aid. Altogether, 
it appears that women among the political elite are more liberal than elite men on social 
welfare issues, though the particular issue and the particular party where differences arise 
depend somewhat on which survey you analyze. 
Among the elite, there are two issues where consistent differences from the non-
elite arise – school prayer and abortion. In both surveys, women are more liberal on the 
issue of school prayer – in the NES the difference appears among Democrats and in the 
CDS the difference appears among Republicans. A more striking difference emerges on 
the issue of abortion. Elite women are consistently and significantly more liberal than 
elite men on allowing access to abortion. In the NES, this difference persists only among 
Democrats but in the CDS the difference is larger among Republicans than Democrats, 
though both groups exhibit significant gender differences. There is a clear difference 




 First, these results provide evidence that the assumption that elite men and women 
differ in their attitudes on policy issues is valid. The results also guide us as to where we 
should expect differences in behavior in Congress to arise. We should see men and 
 82 
women in Congress voting differently on social welfare issues, school prayer, and 
abortion.  
 Second, the results in this chapter present a striking problem for the literature on 
descriptive representation. As discussed in Chapter 2, many scholars who study the effect 
of women in Congress assume that because female members of Congress vote 
differently, they represent women. When scholars find gender differences on health care, 
abortion, and spending on children, they argue that this is evidence of elite women 
sharing the preferences of non-elite women and representing those preferences in office. 
However, as shown in this chapter, elite women and non-elite women do not always 
share the same preferences. We are alerted to this potential problem by the difference in 
the gender gap on abortion between elites and non-elites. While non-elite men and 
women do not differ on the issue of abortion, elite women are more liberal than elite men. 
Of course, this could be true and elite women could have the same attitudes as non-elite 
men and women. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the NES, elite Democratic 
women’s mean on the abortion scale is .90; In the CDS, the Democratic women’s mean is 
very similar at .92. The non-elite Democratic women’s mean is .66. For Republicans, 
though, elite women are closer to non-elite women. In the NES, elite Republican 
women’s mean on the abortion scale is .57; In the CDS, again, the Republican women’s 
mean is similar at .59. The non-elite Republican women’s mean is .57. Here, we find that 
elite and non-elite women have similar preferences. 
 What this highlights is that we cannot assume, just because we find gender 
differences in Congress, that female members of Congress are representing the 
preferences of their female constituents. Instead, female members of Congress are 
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representing their own preferences in Congress, which sometimes mirror the preferences 
of non-elite women and sometimes do not. The question for the next chapter is whether 
politically exploitable heterogeneity in the district can explain when elite men and 
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-0.145*** -0.147*** -0.140*** -0.197*** -0.151*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.204*** -0.045 -0.001 
PE 
(0.017) (0.024) (0.032) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.023) (0.019) 
-0.055 -0.055 0.023 -0.022 -0.053 -0.079 -0.026 0.023 0.046 -0.021 Female 
*PE (0.029) (0.043) (0.055) (0.039) (0.036) (0.045) (0.037) (0.057) (0.041) (0.033) 
0.403*** 0.584*** 0.710*** 0.730*** 0.619*** 0.592*** 0.251*** 0.708*** 0.615*** 0.457*** 
Cons. 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) 
R
2
 0.096 0.047 0.031 0.061 0.076 0.051 0.052 0.080 0.004 0.008 

























0.032*** 0.027* 0.019 0.027** -0.011 0.025* 0.040*** 
Female 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
-0.033* -0.179*** -0.085** -0.053** -0.005 -0.160*** -0.117*** 
PE 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) 
-0.018 0.043 0.093 -0.024 -0.051 -0.025 0.015 Female 
*PE (0.027) (0.039) (0.055) (0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.035) 
0.518*** 0.485*** 0.400*** 0.308*** 0.760*** 0.725*** 0.812*** 
Cons. 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
R
2
 0.090 0.068 0.013 0.020 0.006 0.069 0.026 
































0.028 -0.005 -0.022 0.039 -0.010 0.020 0.006 0.058** 0.120*** 0.045 
Female 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035) 
0.392*** 0.320*** 0.283*** 0.377*** 0.048** 0.288*** 0.241*** 0.354*** 0.398*** 0.460*** 
Dem 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.027) 
0.030 0.051* 0.067** -0.015 0.055* 0.019 0.022 0.007 -0.068* -0.035 Female* 
Dem (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.042) 
0.136*** 0.525*** 0.527*** 0.502*** 0.575*** 0.476*** 0.329*** 0.444*** 0.474*** 0.204*** 
Cons. 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) 
R
2
 0.424 0.337 0.309 0.393 0.036 0.292 0.215 0.365 0.330 0.243 

























-0.042* -0.009 -0.003 0.036 0.059*** -0.028 -0.023 
Female 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) 
0.276*** 0.568*** 0.263*** 0.368*** 0.146*** 0.274*** 0.010 
Dem 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
0.055* 0.042 0.036 -0.025 -0.021 0.070** 0.039 Female* 
Dem (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) 
0.481*** 0.198*** 0.407*** 0.280*** 0.797*** 0.501*** 0.823*** 
Cons. 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
R
2
 0.324 0.561 0.244 0.314 0.136 0.295 0.005 
N 1553 1544 1522 1541 1537 1527 1522 
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Figure 4.1 Government Services 
 
Figure 4.2 Spending on Child Care 
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Figure 4.3 Spending on College Aid 
 
Figure 4.4 Spending on Public Schools 
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Figure 4.5 Spending on Social Security 
 
Figure 4.6 Spending on the Poor 
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Figure 4.7 Spending on Welfare 
 
Figure 4.8 Spending on the Homeless 
 
 94
Figure 4.9 Abortion 
 
Figure 4.10 School Prayer 
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Figure 4.11 Defense Spending 
 
Figure 4.12 Government Health Care 
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Figure 4.13 Spending on Blacks 
 
Figure 4.14 Government Aid to Blacks 
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Figure 4.15 Equal Gender Roles 
 
Figure 4.16 Spending on the Environment 
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Chapter 5  
   Measuring Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity 
 
 Measuring politically exploitable heterogeneity is difficult because it is a 
complicated theoretical concept with multiple components. In this chapter, I propose two 
ways of measuring it. First, I use a standard way of measuring preferences – using 
national survey data. Second, I propose a new way of measuring preferences that, to my 
knowledge, has not been used before to measure preferences in the district. This new 
measure is based on individual contributions in the district to political action committees 
(PACs). The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss the concept of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity and how we would ideally measure the components of the 
concept. Second, I discuss the national survey measure, highlighting the advantages and 
disadvantages of the measure. Third, I discuss the individual contributions measure, also 
discussing the advantages and disadvantages. The next chapter presents the results from 
each measure as a test of the effect of politically exploitable heterogeneity on legislator 
divergence in Congress. 
 
5.1 Measuring Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity 
 Politically exploitable heterogeneity occurs in a district where there is 
disagreement over priorities of issues and preferences on issues. When constituents 
disagree on both priorities and preferences, intense preference minorities form in the 
district, meaning groups who care about an issue and have a particular preference on the 
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issue. These groups are willing to trade a non-preferred position on an issue they care less 
about for their ideal position on the issue they care most about. Referring to our formal 
model discussion, when those who care about the issue have a particular preference on 
the issue, preferences and priorities are correlated. When preferences and priorities are 
correlated on multiple issues, intense preference minority groups exist in the district 
across multiple issues and a legislator can choose which groups to cultivate for an 
election coalition consistent with the legislator’s preferences.  
The important components to measure are whether an intense preference minority 
exists on an issue and whether these groups exist on multiple issues in the district. To 
measure these two components of politically exploitable heterogeneity, within each 
district, we would ideally need a measure of everyone’s priorities over every possible 
issue. We would also need everyone’s position on all issues that are important in the 
district. Using this information, we could then get a measure of the correlation of 
priorities and preferences on each issue in the district. As the correlation increases on two 
or more issues, the level of politically exploitable heterogeneity should also increase. 
Unfortunately, this exact type of data does not exist.  
Because these ideal measures do not exist, we need to set up some guidelines for 
what a good measure will look like. To translate these two components to measurement, 
it is easier to focus on one issue. I use the topic of education, which was discussed in 
Chapter 2 as an issue where there are gender attitude differences among both non-elites 
and elites and as an issue where we find gender differences in Congressional voting.  
First, we want to know whether there is an intense preference minority in the 
district on education. As mentioned above, this means we would like to know whether 
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those who prioritize education have a particular preference on education (e.g. more 
spending on public education). An intense preference minority on education may not 
exist for two reasons. First, there will not be an intense preference minority in the district 
if education is not important in the district. As we know from Kingdon (1989), if the 
district does not care at all about education and cannot be convinced to care about 
education, the legislator is free to follow her preferences on the issue. In this case, we 
would find legislator divergence on the issue. Second, a preference minority may not 
exist when education is important but the constituents who prioritize education do not 
agree in their position on the issue, meaning, for example, some want less spending on 
education and others want more. In this case, the lack of an intense preference minority 
should lead legislators to converge on the median of the issue. In our measurement of the 
presence of intense preference minorities, we need to take these two possibilities into 
account. 
Second, we need to measure whether intense preference minorities exist on 
multiple issues. This aspect of the concept is particularly hard to capture without knowing 
the entire universe of issues relevant in the district as well as having a measure of the 
existence of an intense preference minority on every issue. Even if we do have a measure 
of an intense preference minority on every possible issue, it is difficult to create a useful 
summary measure of the presence of these minorities on other issues that accounts for 
differences in which issue these minorities appear on across districts. Finally, it is also 
difficult to know on which issues a particular candidate would be willing to trade. 
One way to approximate this concept is with a measure of how important the 
issue of interest, education, is relative to other issues. The more dominant the issue of 
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education is in the district, according to our available measures, the less important other 
issues are. The less dominant the issue of education, the more likely it is there are other 
relevant issues. This approximation, however, requires us to make two assumptions. First, 
we need to assume that if education is only one of many issues important in the district, 
that at least one of the other important issues also has an intense preference minority. I 
present some evidence for this assumption. Second, we need to assume that the other 
issue(s) on which there is an intense preference minority is also an issue on which the 
legislator wants to make a trade for their preferences. This is more difficult to provide 
evidence for but, on average, violating this assumption should cause us to underestimate 
the effect of politically exploitable heterogeneity on candidate divergence, since the lack 
of a desirable trade should cause less divergence, not more. With these guidelines for 
measurement, I now discuss the two measures I propose – survey data and individual 
contributions data – and how these measures match up to these guidelines. 
 
5.2 National Survey Data 
 My first measure is based on national survey data. Using survey data is a standard 
way to measure attitudes in the district (Clinton 2006), second only to demographic 
statistics. An advantage of surveys over demographic statistics is they include questions 
that cover a broad array of issue areas without having to assume that the relationship 
between demographics and issue positions is constant across Congressional districts. 
However, there are disadvantages to using survey data to measure district-level attitudes, 
which I discuss more thoroughly below. For my purposes, I use the American National 
Election Surveys (ANES) because they cover the time period with which I am concerned 
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(1992-1998), have position questions on multiple issue areas, and have a question about 
issue priorities. The ANES cover 117 Congressional districts between 1992 and 1998 
with 10 or more respondents (Achen 1978).  
 
5.2.1 Measuring the Presence of Intense Preference Minorities on Education 
As discussed above, the presence of an intense preference minority on the issue of 
education is measured by the correlation between prioritizing the issue of education and 
preference on the issue of education.  To measure issue priority, I used the most 
important national issue question in the ANES. The question first asks respondents to 
name the most important problems the country faces and allows them to give multiple 
answers. Respondents are then asked of the issues they mentioned, what is the “single 
most important problem the country faces” (ANES). Responses to this last question are 
the ones I used to measure which issue is most important to respondents. If a respondent 
names education as the single most important issue, they are likely to prioritize that issue 
when assessing a candidate for national office. The priority questions are coded as 
dummy variables, with 0 representing the respondent did not mention the particular issue 
as their most important issue and 1 representing the respondent did mention the issue. 
Respondents who said “don’t know” to the most important issue question are excluded.  
Next we need a measure of respondents’ positions on the issues. Using the coding 
of the most important issue question available from the ANES, I matched attitude 
questions to the issue areas mentioned by respondents. Appendix A has a full list of 
which important issue codes were matched to which position questions. The issues 
covered are health care, social welfare spending, education, regulating the environment, 
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race, crime, and abortion. The two most popular issues on this list were social welfare 
and crime. The position questions are coded from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the more 
liberal position on the issue. As with the priority question, I excluded “don’t know” 
responses. 
Now that we have measured priority and position, we need to get a measure of the 
correlation between these two components in each district. To do this, I estimated the 
correlation between the priority on an issue and the position on an issue for each issue in 
each of the 117 Congressional districts in the ANES between 1992 and 1998 with an n-
size greater than 10. Higher absolute values of the correlations indicate the presence of 
intense preference minorities who prioritize an issue and have a specific policy position 
on the issue.  
A key decision was whether to use the absolute value of the correlation or the 
signed correlation. The absolute value of the correlation of preference and priority 
indicates that there is an intense preference minority in the district, regardless of whether 
that minority prefers the conservative or liberal position on the issue. This correlation 
indicates the possibility of cycling, meaning the possibility that there is flexibility in the 
district to form different election coalitions. The signed correlation, running from 
negative correlations to positive correlations, indicates the direction of the preference of 
the minority. Positive correlations indicate the preference minority prefers the liberal 
position on the issue, and negative correlations, the conservative position. The directional 
correlation indicates the direction in which cycling will occur. If there is an intense 
preference minority that prefers greater spending on education, it is unlikely the 
candidates in the district will cycle to a position of lower spending on education.  
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Since the direction of the gender gap in Congress is women in favor of greater 
public spending on education, I wanted a measure of areas where there was a possibility 
for cycling in the direction of greater education spending. In these areas, men would 
place themselves at the median voter on education spending, while women would move 
in the direction of the preference minority. However, I also wanted a measure of areas 
where there was a possibility for cycling in the direction of less education spending. In 
these areas, women would place themselves at the median voter on education spending 
and men would move in the direction of the preference minority. Either way, either 
because women were moving away from the median voter or because men were, there 
should be a gender gap in Congressional voting. To measure this possibility, I took the 
absolute value of the correlation on all issues. The higher the value of these correlations, 
the more likely there is an intense preference minority in the district willing to trade 
positions on other issues for their ideal position on the issue they care about, and the 
greater the possibility of cycling. 
 
5.2.2 Measuring the Presence of Other Important Issues 
 To measure whether the issue of education is the only important issue in the 
district, not important at all, or just one of many issues, I use the most important issue 
question.  As discussed earlier, the ideal measure would capture whether there are intense 
preference minorities on more than one issue in the district. However, without an 
adequate measure of the presence of these groups on each issue, we need to approximate 
this ideal by measuring the relative importance of education within the district. To do so, 
I used the proportion of most important responses that mentioned education.  
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When this proportion approaches one there will be less candidate divergence 
because education is the only important issue in the district and there will be no other 
issues on which to trade. When this proportion approaches zero there will be greater 
candidate divergence because education is unimportant in the district and legislators will 
have the freedom to vote as they please. In the middle range of this proportion, education 
is an important issue, but only one of many. In this situation, the presence of an intense 
preference minority will determine whether the legislator has freedom in their voting. If 
there is not an intense preference minority, there is no one willing to trade on the issue 
and legislators will move towards the median voter. If there is an intense preference 
minority, there is someone willing to trade on the issue and legislators will have more 
freedom.  
As mentioned earlier, using this approach to measure the number of important 
issues in the district assumes that if education is only one issue among many in the 
district, then there is likely to be an intense preference minority on one of the other 
issues. This is a key assumption. One way to assess whether this assumption is feasible is 
to look at my measure of the correlation between priorities and preferences on other 
issues. If on other issues the correlation is usually low, then we should doubt this 
assumption. However, if there are multiple districts with at least one other high 
correlation on another issue, then we can have more confidence in this assumption. In the 
data, I have correlations between the most important issue question and attitude positions 
on the issues of health care, social welfare/government spending, abortion, the 
environment, and race. In general, the correlations for these variables range from 0 to a 
high of .8 on the issue of social welfare spending. The means range from .03 on the 
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environment to .19 on health care. At least on the issue of health care or social welfare 
spending, there is likely to be an intense preference minority. The mean correlation on 
these issues is .18 and .16, respectively, in districts where education is also an important 
issue. Both of these issues are important issues in all of the districts where education is 
also important. This data provides some evidence for the assumption that when education 
is only one of many important issues, there is likely to be an intense preference minority 
on another issue. 
 
5.2.3 Validity 
 While the survey measures described above appear to have good face validity, 
another way to assess the quality of a measure is to analyze its predictive validity. A key 
theoretical correlate of politically exploitable heterogeneity is a competitive district. 
While politically exploitable heterogeneity allows a legislator more flexibility in how she 
represents her district, it also creates an opportunity for an opponent to form an 
alternative winning coalition of interests in the district. This opportunity should mean 
these types of districts are more competitive than other districts. In districts where there is 
not politically exploitable heterogeneity there are no other winning coalitions available, 
so as long as the incumbent keeps her coalition happy, there is little opportunity for an 
opponent to challenge the incumbent. 
 The simplest way to measure competition is to look at the actual vote total in the 
district. The closer the margin between the two opposing candidates, the more 
competitive the district was. As a first cut at assessing the predictive validity of the 
survey measures, I regressed actual vote margin in the district on the level of correlation 
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on the issue of education for districts where education is neither the only important issue 
nor an unimportant issue between 1992 and 1998. The results of this regression are in the 
first column of table 5.1.  














R2 0 .04 
N 284 213 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
There is a modest positive effect of a correlation on education on competition in 
the district. Obviously, this is an overly simplified model of competition, though this 
should be where the effect shows up strongest. However, other aspects of a district can 
drive down competition. One such aspect is the presence of an incumbent. Incumbents 
have the opportunity to appeal to constituents through constituency service in a way that 
has nothing to do with their issue positions. This opportunity can temper the effect of 
other aspects of the district on level of competition. When we include a variable 
controlling for the presence of an incumbent, the effect of correlation on education does 
not change. For this second analysis, I had to exclude 1992 because the elections that 
year were after a major redistricting and it is difficult to identify incumbents. The results 
of this estimation are in the second column of table 5.1. 
 This poor showing of the survey measure on predictive validity is discouraging 
for this measure. It means one of two things. One possibility is the theory is incorrect and 
politically exploitable heterogeneity, as I have defined it, does not lead to greater 
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competition, though we have strong reasons to believe it should. The second possibility is 
the measure is a poor approximation of the theoretical concept. 
   
 5.2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
 One major advantage of using national survey data is the face validity of the 
measure. The ideal measure was one that captured both constituents’ priorities over 
issues and positions on issues. The survey does capture those two concepts. However, the 
weak predictive validity of the measure is a cause for alarm. In addition, there are 
multiple problems with the ANES survey as a measure of district attitudes besides the 
obvious caveat that any survey measures of priorities and positions measure these aspects 
of attitudes with error. 
The first set of problems with using the ANES is the sample of respondents. We 
have a small number of non-random Congressional districts, a small number of 
respondents in most districts, and respondents that are not randomly sampled within the 
Congressional district. The included districts tend to be more urban and demographically 
heterogeneous, which may lead to higher levels of politically exploitable heterogeneity 
and therefore capture less of the actual variation in the concept. In addition, without large 
samples in each district, we will not have very precise estimates of the actual 
position/preference correlation in the district. Finally, non-random samples within each 
Congressional district mean we cannot make good estimates about the precision of our 
estimates.  
The second problem is less serious but still important. The question about which 
issue is most important does not match directly to the questions about the respondent’s 
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position on an issue. There is only one year in this time period, 1996, that includes 
questions about priority and position that are worded similarly about the exact same 
issue. However, these questions that map priorities and position with the same question 
wording do not allow us to identify which question is “most important” to the respondent. 
In matching preference questions to priorities named in the “most important” question, 
we run the risk of misinterpreting the preference of respondents on their issue priorities. 
For example, an attitude question on government spending on goods and services may 
not bring to mind the issue of the government’s budget deficit (a common concern listed 
as a most important issue in the early 1990’s). 
Besides not asking importance questions in the same format as the preference 
questions, we also do not have preference questions on every issue that respondents 
mention as important. For example, the most important issue between 1992 and 1998 was 
the economy, with 16 percent of respondents saying it was the most important issue. 
However, we have no consistent measure of preferences on economic policy across the 
time period. Even if we believe that we can identify the universe of important issues in 
the district, the missing preference questions prevent us from measuring the presence of 
an intense preference minority on each issue.  
 
5.3 Individual Contributions Data 
The second measure I use is individuals in the districts’ contributions to political 
action committees (PACs). PACs are committees, either connected to organizations such 
as a corporation or labor union or not, that contribute money to candidates and parties to 
further their cause, whether it is ideological, such as in the case of the National Rifle 
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Association, or the interests of their organization, such as the issue of trade policy for 
labor unions. Individuals who contribute money to political causes tend to be more 
politically aware, interested, and active (Grant and Rudolph 2002). How these individuals 
pick which PAC to donate money to is most likely influenced by whether they support 
the PAC’s particular issue or cause. If so, knowing which PACs receive money in a 
district, we then have a measure of which issues the district is active on and cares about. 
An important note on the influence of this active citizenry who contributes to PACs is 
that not only do contributions as a measure of attitudes appear to be valid, legislators are 
more likely to register the policy demands of those who contribute (Miler 2007).  
To gather data on contributions within the district, I used data from the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) on individual contributions of $200 or more to non-party 
qualified committees for 1992 and 1998. In the FEC data, individuals must identify their 
zip code. To get a measure of contributions by Congressional district, I matched 
contributors’ zip codes to the appropriate Congressional district (Missouri Census Data 
Center). This geographic matching data was only available for 1992 and 1998 and the 
analysis using this measure is therefore restricted to these two years. 
The relationship between zip codes and Congressional districts unfortunately is 
not one to one. While 70 percent of contributors live in a zip code entirely encompassed 
in one congressional district, another 30 percent of contributors live in a zip code that 
overlaps two congressional districts. To account for this overlap, I created two measures 
– one measure that excludes individuals from zip codes that overlap two districts and a 
second measure with the contributions in these overlapping zip codes weighted by the 
proportion of population in the zip code in each Congressional district. For the analyses I 
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use the weighted data but check the results for robustness with the data that excludes the 
overlapping zip codes. 
 
5.3.1 Measuring the Presence of Intense Preference Minorities on Education 
As before, to measure the presence of intense preference minorities, we need to 
know which issues are important and the positions of constituents on those issues. To 
identify the issues that are important, I coded the issues the PACs advocate on using the 
industry coding by the Center for Responsive Politics. The CRP codes the industry of 
each PAC in three detailed levels. First, they code the PACs into 13 sectors, which 
identifies whether the PAC advocates on behalf of a particular business area, a labor 
union, an ideological/single issue, or other. The next two levels provide more detailed 
explanation of the PAC’s issue area. For example, the National Rifle Association is 
coded as 1. Ideological/Single Issue, 2. Gun Rights, 3. Pro-Gun. I used this coding to 
identify which PACs would advocate on the issue area of education. The list of industries 
coded as advocating on education is included in Appendix B.  
After identifying the PACs that advocate on education, I calculated the proportion 
of contributions, both by the number of contributions and the total amount of 
contributions, that were given by individuals within each district. The higher this 
proportion, the more constituents within the district that are concerned about the issue of 
education. Theoretically, if this proportion approached 1, then education would be the 
only issue of importance in the district. If the proportion is 0, then constituents within the 
district are relatively unconcerned about the issue of education.  
 113 
The second aspect of measuring the presence of intense preference minorities is 
measuring the distribution of preferences on the issue. We want to know whether those 
who are interested in the issue of education in the district also have a particular 
preference on the issue. To assess this, I created a measure of bias in the district on the 
issue of education. First, I created a measure of the ideology of the PACs to which 
individuals donated money. To get the ideology of the PACs, I used FEC data on which 
candidates the PACs gave money to in a given election cycle and calculated the 
percentage of the PAC’s money given to Democratic candidates as an indication of the 
PAC’s ideology. On its face, it appears to be a good measure. For example, labor PACs 
gave over 85 percent of their money to Democratic candidates. I then folded this measure 
in half so that PACs that gave half of their money to Democrats and half to Republicans 
were considered unbiased, at 0, and PACs that gave all of their money only to Democrats 
or only to Republicans were considered highly biased at .5. I then created an average of 
the bias across the PACs that received contributions in the issue area in the district, 
weighted by the share of the number (or amount) of contributions to the PAC. Table 5.2 
provides a stylized example of how I calculated the bias measure. 
Table 5.2 Calculating the Bias Measure 




1 Education A .5 5 2.5  
1 Education B .4 3 1.2  
1 Education C .1 2 .2  
Total    10 3.9 .39 
 
2 Education A .5 2 1  
2 Education B .4 2 .8  
2 Education C .1 6 .6  
Total    10 2.4 .24 
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The higher the bias measure in a district on the issue of education, the more correlated 
priorities and preferences are on the issue in the district. When the proportion of 
contributions on education is greater than zero and the bias measure in the district on 
education is high, we should have an intense preference minority on the issue of 
education in the district. 
 
5.3.2 Measuring the Presence of Other Important Issues 
As with the survey measure, I used the proportion of contributions in the district 
that are given to education PACs as an indication of the relative importance of the issue 
of education in the district. Also as before, using this measure we need to assume that at 
least on some of the other issues that are important in the district there is an intense 
preference minority. To provide evidence for this assumption, I calculated the bias 
measure described above for other issue areas identified by the industry coding from the 
CRP. The mean level of bias for other issue areas when education is one of many issues 
important in the district is .22 on a scale of 0 to .5 in 1992 and .26 in 1998. As with the 
survey data, this indicates that when education is one of multiple important issues, there 
is likely to be an intense preference minority on one of the other issues. 
 
5.3.3 Validity 
 As with the survey measure, I test the predictive validity of the individual 
contributions measure by estimating the relationship between the bias measure and 
competition in the district. The contributions measure performs better than the survey 
measure. In the first and third columns of table 5.3 are the results of regressing actual 
 115 
vote margin in the district on the level of bias on the issue of education for districts where 
education is neither the only important issue nor an unimportant issue for 1992 and 1998. 
For both versions of the measure (based on the amount of contributions versus the 
number of contributions), there is a significant positive effect of a bias on education on 
competition in the district. I also estimated the effect of bias when we include the variable 
indicating the presence of an incumbent. For this second analysis, I had to exclude 1992, 
which reduces the analysis to just 1998. The results of this estimation are in the second 
and fourth columns of table 5.3. The effect of the bias is less statistically significant than 
before but still positive. 





























R2 .01 .07 .01 .07 
N 466 253 466 253 
Note: ^ p < .1 * p < .05 ** p < .01 
 
5.3.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
 There are multiple advantages to the individual contributions measure. First, the 
measure is available for all Congressional districts within a given year. Second, the 
measure appears, on its face, to be a good direct measure of constituent concern about an 
issue. It is highly likely that those who contribute to PACs that advocate on the issue of 
education care very much about the issue of education. Finally, unlike the survey 
measure, the individual contributions measure performs relatively well in the predictive 
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validity test. We have a modestly strong relationship between bias on education and 
competition in the district. 
 There is one significant problem with a measure based on monetary contributions. 
Individual income directly affects whether someone contributes and indirectly affects 
who contributes by affecting who is solicited for contributions (Grant and Rudolph 
2002). In poorer communities, we may have active and intense preference minorities that 
are not captured by my measure. In the next chapter, I try to account for this bias in the 
measure by controlling for median income in the district in my analyses. Importantly, this 
problem with the measure should affect our estimates by depressing the effect of 
politically exploitable heterogeneity (PEH), since those poorer districts with high levels 
of PEH will be lumped together with richer districts that have low levels of PEH, instead 
of exaggerating the effect. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I discussed two ways of measuring politically exploitable 
heterogeneity. Each measure has advantages and disadvantages and by using both 
measures we can be more confident in the results. The next chapter tests the effect of 




Policy Questions and Important Issue Codes 
 
Issue Policy Question  
(ANES CDF) 
Important Issue Codes  
(ANES CDF Appendix) 
Health VCF0806: “There is much 
concern about the rapid rise in 
medical and hospital costs.  
Some people feel there should 
be a government insurance plan 
which would cover all medical 
and hospital expenses for 
everyone.  (1996: Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, 
at point 1). Others feel that  
(1994-1996: all) medical 
expenses should be paid by 
individuals,  
and through private insurance 
plans like Blue Cross  (1984-
1994: or [1996:some] other 
company paid plans). (1996: 
Suppose these people are at the 
other end, at point 7.  And of 
course, some people have 
opinions somewhere in between 
at points 2,3,4,5 or 6.) Where 
would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven't you thought 
much about this?” 
40: HEALTH PROBLEMS/COST OF 
MEDICAL CARE; quality of medical 
care; medical research/training of 
doctors and other health personnel; 
hospitals; National Health insurance 
program 
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Soc. Welf 1 VCF0839: “Some people think 
the government should provide 
fewer services, even in areas 
such as health and education, in 
order to reduce spending. Other 
people feel that it is important 
for the government to provide 
many more services even if it 
means an increase in spending. 
Where would you place yourself 
on this scale, or haven't you 
thought much about this?” 
VCF9046: “If you had a say in 
making up the federal budget 
this year, for which programs 
would you like to see spending 
increased and for which would 
you like to see spending 
decreased: Should federal 
spending on [ITEM] be 
increased, decreased or kept 
about the same?” “Food stamps” 
 
VCF0886: federal spending 
“poor/poor people” 
VCF0893: federal spending “the 
homeless” 
VCF0894: federal spending 
“welfare programs” 
VCF9049: federal spending 
“social security” 
60: POVERTY; aid to the 
poor/underprivileged people; help for 
the (truly) needy; welfare programs 
(such as ADC); general reference to 
anti-poverty programs; hunger/help 
for hungry people in the U.S. 
90: SOCIAL WELFARE 
PROBLEMS; "welfare"--NFS  
415: AGAINST (increased) 
government spending; balancing of 
the (national) budget; against 
government stimulation of the 
economy; the size of the budget deficit 
30: AGED/ELDERLY; social security 
benefits; administration of social 
security; medical care for the aged; 
medicare benefits; insuring against 
catastrophic illness 
92: Against general or other social 
welfare programs; "too many give 
away programs for the people who 
don't deserve it" 
6: DAY CARE; child care 
35: Social Security won't be around in 
the future; paying into a system which 
won't benefit me/them 
91: For general or other social welfare 
programs; "we need to help people 
more" 
Soc. Welf 2 Same as above Same as above, excluding code 415 
Education VCF0890: federal spending 
“public schools”  
VCF0891: federal spending 
“financial aid for college 
students” 
20: EDUCATION; financial 
assistance for 





Abortion VCF0838: “There has been 
some discussion about abortion 
during recent years. Which one 
of the opinions on this page best 
agrees with your view? You can 
just tell me the number of the 
opinion you choose. 1. By law, 
abortion should never be 
permitted. 
2. The law should permit 
abortion only in case of rape, 
incest, or when the woman's life 
is in danger. 
3. The law should permit 
abortion for reasons other than 
rape, incest, or danger to the 
woman's life, but only after the 
need for the abortion has been 
clearly established. 
4. By law, a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
abortion as a matter of personal 
choice.” 
45: PRO-ABORTION; pro-choice; the 
right of a woman to control her body 
46: ANTI-ABORTION; pro-life; 
"abortion"--NFS 
Environment VCF9047: federal spending 
“improving and protecting the 
environment” 
VCF0842: “Some people think 
we need much tougher 
government regulations on 
business in order to protect the 
environment.  (Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, 
at point 1.)  Other think that 
current regulations to protect the 
environment are already too 
much of a burden on business.  
(Suppose these people are at the 
other end of the scale, at point 
7.)  And, of course, some other 
people have opinions 
somewhere in between, at points 
2,3,4,5 or 6. Where would you 
place yourself on this scale, or 
haven't you thought much about 
this?” 
151: Controlling/REGULATING 
GROWTH or land development; 
banning further growth/development 
in crowded or ecologically sensitive 
areas; preserving natural areas 
153: POLLUTION; clean air/water  
154: Disposal of 
RADIOACTIVE/TOXIC waste 
(dumps, landfills) 
160:  DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES /ENERGY 
SOURCES; harbors, dams, canals, 
irrigation, flood control, navigation, 
reclamation; location, mining, stock-
piling of minerals; water power, 
atomic power; development of 
alternative sources of energy (includes 
mentions of solar or nuclear power) 
150: CONSERVATION OF 
NATURAL RESOURCES; 
conservation, ecology; protecting the 
environment/endangered species 
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Crime VCF0888: federal spending 
“dealing with crime” 
340: CRIME/VIOLENCE; too much 
crime; streets aren't safe; mugging, 
murder, shoplifting; drug related crime 
320: NARCOTICS; availability of 
drugs; extent of drug/alcohol addiction 
in the U.S.; interdiction of drugs 
coming to the U.S. from foreign 
countries; alcohol or drug related 
crime 
360: LAW AND ORDER; respect for 
the law/police; support for the police; 
death penalty; tougher sentences for 
criminals; need for more prisons 
Race VCF0830: “Some people feel 
that the government in 
Washington should make every 
(prior to 1996 only: possible) 
effort to improve the social and 
economic position of blacks. 
(1996-LATER: Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, 
at point 1). Others feel that the 
government should not make 
any special effort to help blacks 
because they should help 
themselves. (1996-LATER:  
Suppose these people are at the 
other end, at point 7. And, of 
course, some other people have 
opinions somewhere in between, 
at points 2,3,4,5 or 6). Where 
would you place yourself on this 
scale, or haven't you thought 
much about it?” 
VCF9050: federal spending 
“programs that assist blacks” 
300: CIVIL RIGHTS/RACIAL 
PROBLEMS; programs to enable 
Blacks to gain 
social/economic/educational/political 
equality; relations between Blacks and 
whites 
304: Discrimination against whites; 
preferred treatment given to minorities 
302: PROTECTION (expansion) OF 
WHITE MAJORITY; maintenance of 
segregation; right to choose own 






List of Industry Codes for Education Political Action Committees 
1
st
 Category: Industry 2
nd
 Category: Sector 3
rd
 Category: Catname 
Education Other Education 
Education Other Law schools 
Education Other Medical schools 
Education Other 
Public school teachers, 
administrators & officials 
Education Other Schools & colleges 
Education Other 
Technical, business and 
vocational schools & svcs 
Public Sector Unions Labor Teachers unions 
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Chapter 6  
  Empirical Results: Politically Exploitable Heterogeneity and Legislator Divergence 
 
 In this chapter, I present the results from testing the effect of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity (PEH) on the gender difference in Congress using two separate 
measures of PEH. I find that PEH does not affect the gender gap in the way I expected. 
Instead, when an issue is important and the interested constituency is biased in their 
opinion on the issue, the gender gap disappears. In addition, the results are impressively 
consistent across the two measures. The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss 
the model and method I use to estimate the effect of PEH. Second, I present the results 
for the survey data measure of PEH. Third, I present the results for the measure that relies 
on individual contributions to political action committees. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of the results, suggesting reasons why PEH, as measured and construed here, 
had the opposite result than expected. 
 
6.1 Model and Estimation 
 To estimate the impact of politically exploitable heterogeneity on the gender gap 
in Congress, I use the scale of education votes I first introduced in Chapter 2. As 
discussed earlier, I chose to look at education because I find a persistent gender 
difference in attitudes on the issue. The voting scale I use in this chapter are the votes 
rated by the National Education Association, the American Association of University 
Women, and the Americans for Democratic Action. The scale runs from zero to one. One 
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indicates a vote with the interest groups on all bills. Given the platforms of these interest 
groups, high values on this vote scale indicate a more liberal position on education, 
including greater support for more funding for public education. 
 The key independent variables are the representative’s gender, the relative 
importance of education in the district, and the bias of interested constituents’ attitudes on 
education in the district. The gender variable is a dummy variable, where 1 represents a 
woman. The importance and bias variables were described in great detail in the last 
chapter. Both variables for the survey data and the importance variable for the 
contributions data theoretically run from 0 to 1, however in the dataset they are much 
more truncated. For the survey data, the bias variable runs from 0 to .58, where this is the 
correlation between whether respondents name education as the nation’s most important 
issue and respondents’ position on the education scale. The importance variable runs 
from 0 to .35. This is the percentage of respondents in the district who named education 
as the nation’s most important issue. For the contributions data, the importance variable 
runs from 0 to .29. This is the percentage of contributions in the district given to 
education political action committees. While the importance variables runs to .29, it is 
highly skewed towards 0. The mean is .01 and the median is .0002. The bias variable 
from the contributions data runs from .02 and .5. This is the folded percentage of 
contributions that education PACs in the district gave to one political party weighted by 
the number (or amount) of contributions each PAC received in the district. A 0 would 
mean that the education PACs gave equally to Republican and Democratic candidates. A 
.5 means that the PACs gave all of their money to one party only. 
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The control variables are the representative’s party, the district’s liberalness, the 
representative’s seniority, and congressional dummies. The party variable is for whether 
the legislator is a Republican (1) or not (0). For constituency attitudes, I use the estimated 
constituency attitude using the relationships between demographics and attitudes from the 
NES and census data from the district. The measure runs from 0 to 1. A 1 indicates a 
more liberal district. Representative’s seniority is measured by the number of years the 
member has been in Congress. This runs from 0 to 48. The congressional dummies are 
dummy indicators for each Congress, with the 103
rd
 Congress as the excluded category.  
 In addition to these controls, I also include the median income in the district for 
the estimations using the contributions data measures. As discussed in the last chapter, 
personal income is both directly and indirectly related to whether someone contributes to 
a political cause. Because of this relationship, I control for median income to account for 
the fact that poorer districts with higher PEH may not be included in these measures. 
Ideally, I would like to estimate a full three-term interaction model with the sex 
variable, the issue importance variable, and the issue bias variable included. There are 
two reasons this full model cannot be fully estimated with my data. First, the small 
number of female representatives in my dataset means that at any intersection of the 
importance and bias variable, there are very few observations to estimate the gender gap. 
In fact, at many combinations of the importance and bias variables there are no women. 
Second, given the way I measured bias in the district, we have no estimate of bias in 
districts where the issue of education is unimportant. Once the measure of bias is 
included in the model, because this measure is missing for districts where no one cares 
about education, we have a smaller number of women in the sample. For example, for the 
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survey data, we have 62 women in the sample of districts for which we have the issue 
importance measure, but only 41 women in the sample that has both the importance and 
bias measure. There is a similar drop-off for the contributions data – 103 women and 80 
women, respectively. 
For these reasons, I begin each section of the results by estimating the effect of 
issue importance and issue bias on the gender gap in Congress separately. However, I 
also estimate the full three-term interaction model as well. For all versions of the model, I 
estimate the model using standard OLS. The three models are as follows. 








Fem * Impt + "nControls+ #  
Ed is the scale of NEA/AAUW/ADA rated education bills. Female is the legislator’s sex. 
Impt is the issue importance in the district. Fem*Impt is the interaction between 
legislator’s sex and issue importance in the district. As noted above, the controls are 
party, district liberalness, seniority, and the congressional term dummies. I expect the 
effect of female when the issue of education is completely unimportant ("
1
) to be positive 
because women are more likely to support greater public spending on education than 
men. Traditionally, we expect that as an issue rises in importance in the district, 
legislators should be more beholden to their constituency (Kingdon). Therefore, we 
should expect the effect of issue importance on the gender gap ("
3
) to be negative 
because as the issue of education becomes more important, men and women from similar 
districts will be less likely to vote differently from each other. However, as I argued in 
Chapter 3, the level of bias in the district should modify this relationship, and therefore I 
expect "
3
 to not be significant. 










Controls+ #  
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In equation 2, Bias represents the level of bias on the issue of education in the district. 
Fem*Bias is the interaction of representatives’ gender and bias in the district. Because the 
measure of bias only exists when education is an issue people in the district care about, 
the number of districts used to estimate this model will be smaller than in the model with 
just importance. When bias is low, the effect of gender ("
1
) should be zero. This is 
because when the issue of education is important but there is no intense preference 
minority on the issue, the legislator cannot create a different coalition from someone else 
on the issue of education. As bias in the district on education increases, the effect on the 
gender gap ("
3
) should be positive, as the presence of bias indicates the presence of an 
intense preference minority available for a legislator to make a unique election coalition 
on the issue of education. 

















Fem * Impt *Bias+ "nControls+ # 
As before, because the bias measure is included in this model, the model is estimated 
only for districts where the issue of education is important. "
1
 represents the effect of 
gender when the importance of education and bias is low in the district. Because the 
district does not care about the issue of education, I expect there to be a large gender 
difference. "
1
 should be positive and significant. "
2
 is the effect of the importance of 
education on voting for men when bias in the district is low. The importance of education 
should not affect the position of legislators and therefore "
2
 should be zero. "
3
 is the 
effect of bias in the district on voting for men when issue importance is low. Again, the 
bias in the district (since it is not directional but absolute) should not affect the position of 
legislators and therefore "
3
 should also be zero. Increasing either bias or importance 
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should have no effect on the position of legislators and therefore "
4
 should also be zero. 
"
5
 represents the effect of issue importance on the gender gap in Congress when bias in 
the district is low. As issue importance increases we should see a smaller gender gap, on 
average. "
5
 should be negative. "
6
 is the effect of bias on the gender gap when the issue 
of education is unimportant. Bias should not make a difference in these districts because 
education is relatively unimportant and the gender gap should remain large. "
6
 should 
also be zero. Finally, "
7
 is the effect on the gender gap of both increasing bias in the 
district and the importance of education. I expect that when the district cares about 
education and bias increases the gender gap should get larger, as these districts allow 
legislators to take advantage of an intense preference minority on the issue education to 
pursue their own policy preferences on education. "
7
 should be positive and significant.  
 Many of these expectations also lead us to a prediction about the combination of 
some of the important estimated effects. First, the gender gap on the issue of education 
should decrease as the importance of education increases while bias is low. This effect is 








 to be smaller than "
1
.  
Second, the gender gap on the issue of education as bias increases when education is 




. Because I expect bias to be 




 should be 
approximately equal to "
1
. Finally, I expect that the gender gap will increase as bias 









. The sum of these four estimated effects when bias 
and importance are high should be larger than "
1
. These expectations are represented in 
the graph below. The graph is the effect of bias on the marginal effect of gender for three 
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levels of issue importance. The line for when education is not important is dotted because 
I do not have a measure of bias when education is unimportant. The marginal effect of 
gender decreases as education becomes more important. When education is the only issue 
in the district, there should be no gender gap. However, because this situation does not 
occur in the data, this line is also dotted. The key to testing the theory is the middle line 
where education is important, though not the only issue. Here, an increase in bias should 
increase the gender gap. 
 










6.2 Results with Survey Data 
 In this section I present the results of the effect of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity on the gender gap in Congress using my measure based on survey data. 
First, I estimate the model with just issue importance. Second, I estimate the model with 








Education Not Important 
Education Important 
Education Only Issue 
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6.2.1 Model with Issue Importance 
 The results of the interaction of gender and issue importance are in the first 
column of table 6.1 below.  








Female 0.079^ 0.217** 0.307** 
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.111) 
Importance -0.111 -- 0.186 
 (0.147)  (0.273) 
Bias -- 0.059 0.121 
  (0.096) (0.186) 
Impt*Bias -- -- -0.480 
   (1.015) 
Fem*Impt -0.250 -- -1.100 
 (0.498)  (1.281) 
Fem*Bias -- -0.807** -1.061^ 
  (0.274) (0.590) 
Fem*Impt*Bias -- -- 2.723 
   (3.724) 
Republican -0.724** -0.740** -0.739** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) 
District Liberalness 0.259 -0.190 -0.218 
 (0.301) (0.400) (0.409) 
Seniority 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
104
th
 Congress -0.068* -0.098* -0.100* 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) 
105
th
 Congress -0.152** -0.133** -0.135** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.036) 
106
th
 Congress -0.174** -0.167** -0.166** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constant 0.853** 1.043** 1.036** 
 (0.148) (0.200) (0.203) 
R
2
 0.777 0.794 0.795 
N 471 285 285 




As discussed above, we expect "
1
 (the effect of sex) to be positive and the effect 
on the interaction of sex and issue importance ("
3
) to be negative, though insignificant. 
This expectation is borne out in the table. The effect of gender when the issue of 
education is unimportant ("
1
) is positive and very close to significance. The effect of 
issue importance on the gender gap ("
3
) is also in the expected direction – negative – and 
statistically insignificant, though may be substantively significant. Because the 
distribution of issue importance is so truncated, it is helpful to look at a table of predicted 
values for the mean and one standard deviation above and below the mean of importance. 
These values are in table 6.2 below.  









-1 SD: 0 0.26 0.34 0.08 
Mean: 0.06 0.25 0.32 0.07 
+1 SD:0.13 0.24 0.29 0.05 
Difference: 
+1SD - -1SD 
  -0.03 
 
As importance increases the gender gap decreases almost by half – from .08 on a 0 to 1 
scale to .05. While increasing importance does not cause the gender gap to disappear, it 
does have a substantively important effect on the magnitude of the gap. 
 
6.2.2 Model with Issue Bias 
 The results of the model with sex and issue bias interacted is in the second 
column of table 6.1. To reiterate, we expect "
1
, the effect of sex when bias is zero, to be 
zero. With no intense preference minorities on the issue of education, men and women 
should have similar election coalitions on the issue of education and therefore vote 
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similarly in Congress. "
3
, on the other hand, should be positive and significant. 
Increasing bias should create the opportunity for different election coalitions and increase 
the gender gap on education. The effects of sex and bias are the opposite of my 
expectations. When bias is zero, the effect of sex is large and significant. Increasing bias 
decreases the effect of gender on voting, instead of increasing the effect. This change in 
the gender gap as bias increases is statistically significant. As with issue importance, our 
measure of bias is truncated. To get a better idea of the magnitude of the effect of bias on 
the gender gap, I produced predicted values for the mean and one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of bias in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Predicted Values for Issue Bias Model for Survey Data 







-1 SD: 0.01 0.23 0.44 0.21 
Mean: 0.14 0.24 0.34 0.1 
+1 SD: 0.27 0.25 0.25 0 
Difference: 
+1SD - -1SD 
  -0.21 
 
Increasing bias from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation 
above causes the gender gap in voting to disappear. This is opposite of my predictions for 
the effect of bias on the gender gap. 
 
6.2.3 Model with Full Three-Term Interactions 
 At first glance, the full three-term interaction model does not appear to be far 
from my expectations. The results are in column three of table 6.1. The important 
expectations were: "
1
 (sex) would be positive and significant, "
5
 (sex interacted with 
importance) would be negative, "
6




full three term interaction) would be positive and significant. The results show that "
1
 is 
positive and significant, "
5
 is negative, and "
7
 is positive, though not significant. The 
real difference is that "
6
 is negative and very close to statistically significant. This is key 
for assessing the theory. Earlier, I pointed out that the effect of sex when bias is high and 
education is important should be higher than the effect of sex when bias is low and 










Substituting the estimated effects, we get 
.31"1.10Impt "1.06Bias+ 2.72Impt *Bias  
Calculating the effect of sex when importance and bias are one standard deviation below 
the mean (.04 and .01, respectively), we get an effect of sex of .26. This is a large, 
substantively significant gender gap.  When we increase importance and bias to one 
standard deviation above the mean (.17 and .27, respectively), the effect of sex decreases 
to -.04. This is a large decrease in the effect of sex and contrary to my expectations.  
To further illustrate the full three-term interaction model, I graphed the marginal 
effect of gender as bias changes for three levels of issue importance – at the mean and 
one standard deviation below and above the mean. This graph is in figure 6.2. The 
majority of observations are between .01 and .27 on the bias measure, though the graph 
includes the full range of the bias measure – 0 to .58. The stars indicate areas where the 
effect of sex is statistically significant at the .05 level. At low levels of bias, the effect of 
sex is positive and significant, though it decreases as the importance of education 
increases. As bias increases, the effect of sex decreases to zero. 
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6.3 Contributions Data 
 In this section I present the results of estimating the effect of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity with the individual contributions measure. As discussed earlier, 
the models now include median income as a control due to the strong relationship 
between income and contributions. The results with the contributions data are similar to 
the results with the survey data, though not exactly the same. While bias as measured 
with the survey data had a larger effect on the gender gap than issue importance, the 
opposite is true with the contributions data. Despite this difference, the substantive 
interpretation of the results is the same. 
                                                
8
 The coding for these graphs comes from Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). 
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6.3.1 Model with Issue Importance 
 The results for the model with the interaction of sex and issue importance are in 
the first column of table 6.4 below.  








Female 0.075** 0.090 0.076 
 (0.021) (0.060) (0.073) 
Importance 0.032 -- -0.147 
 (0.393)  (0.684) 
Bias -- 0.024 0.024 
  (0.064) (0.072) 
Impt*Bias -- -- -0.084 
   (2.844) 
Fem*Impt -2.064 -- 2.354 
 (1.651)  (9.763) 
Fem*Bias -- -0.053 0.011 
  (0.170) (0.195) 
Fem*Impt*Bias -- -- -10.102 
   (21.990) 
Republican -0.585** -0.582** -0.583** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
District Liberalness 0.262 0.016 0.003 
 (0.189) (0.263) (0.264) 
Seniority 0.002 0.002^ 0.002^ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Median Income -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
106
th
 Congress -0.176** -0.183** -0.183** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 0.885** 1.034** 1.039** 
 (0.092) (0.136) (0.137) 
R
2
 0.759 0.767 0.768 
N 865 464 464 




As discussed, I expect the effect of sex ("
1
) to be positive and "
3
 (the interaction of sex 
and importance) to be negative though not significant. These expectations are supported 
by the results, though to assess whether the interaction is substantively significant we 
need to check the predicted values because the importance variable is very truncated. 
Below in table 6.5 are the predicted values for the mean and one standard deviation above 
and below the mean for the issue importance variable. 









-1 SD: 0 0.35 0.43 0.08 
Mean: 0.01 0.35 0.41 0.06 
+1 SD: 0.03 0.35 0.37 0.02 
Difference: 
+1SD - -1SD 
  -0.06 
 
The effect of increasing importance is substantively significant. Increasing the 
importance of education from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above reduces the gender gap to close to zero.  
 
6.3.2 Model with Issue Bias 
 The results for the model with an interaction between sex and issue bias is in the 
second column of table 6.4. While I expected "
1
 (the effect of sex when bias is zero) to 
be close to zero and "
3
 (the interaction of sex and bias) to be positive, the results are the 
opposite. The effect of sex when bias is zero is substantively significant and increasing 
the issue bias decreases the effect of sex on educational voting. These results are very 
similar to the ones with the survey data. The predicated values for the mean and one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of bias are below in table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 Predicted Values for Issue Bias Model for Contributions Data 







-1 SD: 0.19 0.37 0.45 0.08 
Mean: 0.34 0.37 0.45 0.08 
+1 SD: 0.49 0.38 0.44 0.06 
Difference: 
+1SD - -1SD 
  -0.02 
 
As we can see from the predicted values, the substantive difference in the gender gap 
from increasing the issue bias is very small. Increasing the level of bias from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean decreases 
the gender gap by only two points. As discussed above, this pattern is opposite the pattern 
we found with the survey data where the effect of increasing bias in the district had a 
larger impact on the gender gap than increasing importance in the district. However, both 
with the contributions data and the survey data, increasing the importance of education in 
the district and the bias on education in the district decreases the effect of gender on 
voting, contrary to expectations. 
 
6.3.3 Model with Full Three-Term Interactions 
 Unlike the full three-term interaction model with the survey data, the full 
interaction model with the contributions data does not match at all the expectations 
outlined in the first section of this chapter. The results are in column three of table 6.4. 
Again, the expectations were: "
1
 (sex) would be positive and significant, "
5
 (sex 
interacted with importance) would be negative, "
6
 (sex interacted with bias) would be 
zero, and "
7
 (the full three term interaction) would be positive and significant. The 
results show that "
1
 is positive but statistically insignificant, "
5






 conforms to expectations, with the effect very close to zero. This is 
unsurprising given the results we just discussed. The effect of sex in the three-term 










Substituting the estimated effects, we get 
.08 + 2.35Impt + .01Bias"10.10Impt *Bias 
Calculating the effect of sex when importance and bias are one standard deviation below 
the mean (.000002 and .19, respectively), we get an effect of sex of .08. This is a modest 
but still substantively significant gender gap.  When we increase importance and bias to 
one standard deviation above the mean (.03 and .49, respectively), the effect of sex 
decreases to .004. This is a substantively significant decrease in the effect of sex and 
contrary to my expectations, as we found with the survey data.  
To further illustrate the full three-term interaction model, I graphed the marginal 
effect of gender as bias changes for three levels of issue importance – at the mean and 
one standard deviation below and above the mean. This graph is in figure 6.3. The 
majority of observations are between .19 and .49 on the bias measure, though the graph 
includes the full range of the bias measure – 0 to .5. The stars indicate areas where the 
effect of sex is statistically significant at the .05 level. At low levels of bias (around .19), 
the effect of sex is positive and significant, though it decreases slightly as the importance 
of education increases. As bias increases, the effect of sex decreases to zero, especially 








While the fact that my results are substantively similar across two very different 
measures suggests high robustness, I also completed a round of robustness checks on the 
models. The robustness checks include:  
1. using a different measure of district attitudes based on the NES survey 
question about federal spending for schools,  
2. using a different measure of district attitudes that consisted of including 
census demographic statistics: percent white, percent poverty, percent 
over 65, percent urban, percent with a college degree, Southern region, 
Western region 
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3. because the education scale is clustered at 0 and 1, using a different 
version of the dependent variable broken into three categories and 
estimating the models with ordered probit 
4. estimating each of the models by year instead of pooling the years 
5. excluding the interaction terms that I expect to have no effect because 
of the large demand the full models place on my data 
6. for the survey data models, estimating the models for districts with 20 
or more respondents only 
7. for the survey data models, including the number of respondents in the 
district as a control variable 
8. for the contributions data models, estimating the models with the 
measures based on the amount of contributions instead of the number of 
contributions 
9. for the contributions data models, estimating the models with the 
measures based on zip codes that are fully encompassed in a 
Congressional district instead of the weighted data 
In all, this list of robustness checks led to 10 re-estimations of each model for the 
survey data and 8 re-estimations of each model for the contributions data. Of these 54 re-
estimations, only 2 of the new estimations changed the substantive interpretation of the 
coefficients – in 1994 for the survey data for the issue importance model and the full 
three-term interaction model. However, these results are highly suspect because of the 
small number of observations in 1994 for the survey data. For the issue importance 
model, the total number of observations is 114 and the number of women is 14. For the 
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full three-term interaction model, the total number of observations is 69 and the number 
of women is 10. Because of the small number of observations and the complex nature of 
these models, I consider these two deviations to be unreliable. For the most part, the 
results reported in this chapter appear to be very robust.  
In addition to these robustness checks, I also checked the models for influential 
outliers. In the simpler models with just the two-term interactions there were no outliers 
for either the survey data or the contributions data. However, for the survey data for the 
full three-term interaction model there were two outliers – Congressional districts 5502 
and 5301. These districts were both represented by a Democratic female in one Congress 
and a Republican male in another. These cases would be the ideal demonstration of 
politically exploitable heterogeneity. Dropping these outliers did change the estimated 
coefficients but the substantive interpretation is the same. As bias increases and issue 
importance increases, the effect of sex decreases. In addition, dropping these two outliers 
leads to two more districts becoming outliers, and so on. The small number of women in 
my dataset makes both estimating a full three-term interaction model and dropping 
outliers perilous (Granato, Ingelhart, Leblang 1996). For the contributions data, the full 
three-term interaction model had one outlier, though dropping this outlier did not change 
the results. 
 If the results are robust, what do they mean? First, they are contrary to my 
expectations given my theory. According to my results, the presence of intense 
preference minorities, meaning when an issue is important in the district and constituents 
who care about the issue have a biased view on the issue, does not increase the gender 
gap. This could occur for two reasons. First, the theory may be wrong. Intense preference 
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minorities may not lead to politically exploitable heterogeneity and therefore to larger 
voting gaps between legislators. While this is a strong possibility, the theory is based on 
established theoretical results and is compelling. Second, the measurement of the theory 
may be wrong. Whether or not the theory is correct, this second reason is very likely. The 
concept of politically exploitable heterogeneity is extremely complex and, while 
measured here based on one issue, involves complex interactions in the district among 
issues. In the next chapter I suggest a couple ways to further investigate the concept of 
politically exploitable heterogeneity as defined in this dissertation. 
 Finally, in line with the suggestion that the theory of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity is incorrect, the results in this chapter are impressively consistent with the 
theory of legislative voting developed by Fiorina in his 1974 book, Representatives, Roll-
Calls, and Constituencies. In this book, Fiorina argues that when a constituency cares 
about an issue, a legislator is going to attempt to please their constituency on the issue, as 
a displeased constituency is more harmful than a pleased constituency is helpful. Second, 
Fiorina also argues that when there are two constituency groups that care about an issue, 
whether they agree on their position or not is key for how a legislator behaves. If the 
groups agree, the legislator will vote in lockstep with the group. This expectation 
corresponds with the situation in my data when those who care about the issue are biased. 
While I argue bias should increase the gender gap, Fiorina would disagree and argue that 
bias should decrease the gender gap. According to Fiorina, it is when there is 
disagreement between groups on the issue, when there is low bias in my data, that 
legislators cannot win by choosing one group over another and therefore vote how they 
want.  
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Clearly, the results in this chapter more strongly support Fiorina’s expectations 
than my own. However, Fiorina argues that legislators vote issue-by-issue, disregarding 
how they will vote on other issues or other legislation. This emphasis on issue-by-issue, I 
argue, ignores the electoral arena in which legislators are elected and make promises to 
their constituency on multiple issues in a single platform. Because there is evidence that 
these promises matter for how legislators later behave in Congress (Sulkin 2005), I argue 
in the next chapter that politically exploitable heterogeneity in the district is a useful 
concept that we should continue to pursue, despite these early discouraging results. 
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Chapter 7  
    Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I conclude the dissertation with a summary of the theory and 
results, highlighting the contributions of the project to political science. I also discuss in 
greater detail the implications of the results for the theory. Finally, I propose some 
avenues for further research. 
 
7.1 Summary of Dissertation 
 This dissertation was motivated by the puzzling persistence of a gender gap in 
Congressional voting. While descriptive representation scholars argue that the gender gap 
is a result of female legislators’ unique policy preferences, traditional studies of 
legislative behavior and formal models of candidate competition argue that legislators’ 
preferences are insufficient to drive legislator divergence on important issues. In chapter 
2, I investigate some alternative explanations for the gender gap, including biased 
partisan voters, systematically different primary voters, and differential information.  
Biased partisan voters might lead to divergence if they are biased towards a 
particular candidate based on party identification, regardless of issue preferences. This 
bias should allow candidates who benefit from the bias the freedom to move away from 
the median voter in the direction of their policy preferences. However, in Chapter 2, we 
find that partisan bias in the district has no effect on the gender gap in Congress. I then 
tested whether male and female legislators have systematically different primary median 
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voters. If candidates are elected through primary and general elections, the candidates 
will have to place themselves at the policy point in between their primary median voter 
and their general election median voter. Therefore, if men and women have the same 
general election median voter, differences in legislative voting may be explained by 
differences in the primary median voter. As with biased voters, the evidence on 
systematically different primaries shows that men and women tend to be elected by 
similar primary median voters and differences in primaries cannot explain the gender gap 
in Congress. Finally, I tested whether differential levels of voter information can explain 
the gender gap. The argument was that if female candidates made an effort to selectively 
inform female citizens, the female median voter would have more influence in districts 
with female candidates. This differential in information could lead to differences in 
Congressional voting. Again, the results in Chapter 2 lend little support to this argument, 
with female candidates for the House having little effect on female citizens’ levels of 
political information or political participation. The failure of these three plausible 
explanations to account for the gender gap in Congress emphasized the puzzle. If 
preferences are insufficient and other modifications to the traditional median voter theory 
do not explain the persistent gender gap, we are left with the question, under what 
conditions will legislators pursue their preferences instead of the preferences of the 
median voter? 
To answer this question, I proposed a theory of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity and legislator divergence. The theory has two components. The first 
component argues that legislators must form an electoral coalition in the district in order 
to win office. When creating this coalition, I argue legislators will want to choose groups 
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in the district that agree with their policy preferences in order to build electoral support 
for voting their preferences once in office. However, the composition of the district will 
constrain when legislators have a choice among groups in the district. Since I argue that 
legislators prioritize winning over voting their policy preferences, if a district does not 
allow legislators to choose which groups are part of the coalition, the legislator will form 
the coalition that helps her to get elected and vote with this coalition’s preferences once 
in office. 
The second component of the theory addresses when legislators will be able to 
choose the groups they include in their electoral coalition. Multiple scholars have argued 
that district heterogeneity, usually measured as demographic diversity, should lead to 
legislator divergence. I argue in Chapter 3 that these results provide us with little 
theoretical guidance as to how to conceptually define heterogeneity. I propose that 
demographic diversity may sometimes lead to politically exploitable heterogeneity and at 
other times may lead to politically non-exploitable heterogeneity. Only when politically 
exploitable heterogeneity is present in the district will legislators be able to choose which 
groups to include in their electoral coalition and therefore diverge from legislators from 
similar districts. 
I define politically exploitable heterogeneity as when constituents in the district 
disagree on the relative priority of issues and disagree on the policy solutions to these 
issues. When this occurs, then constituents form intense preference minorities who are 
willing to trade less-preferred positions on issues they care less about for their ideal 
position on the issue they care most about. When these minorities form, this creates the 
opportunity for candidates to cultivate some groups with whom they agree while another 
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candidate can cultivate other groups in the district. While this allows candidates to form 
an electoral coalition consistent with their policy preferences and therefore vote with their 
policy preferences in office, this opportunity should also lead to more electorally 
competitive districts because an opponent can also form a different winning coalition. 
When this type of heterogeneity does not exist in the district, candidates have no choice 
in whom to cultivate for their electoral coalition and we should not see divergence in 
these types of districts. 
A key assumption of the theory is that male and female legislators have different 
policy preferences they would like to pursue in office. There is strong evidence for this 
assumption. Across two different surveys, the American National Election Surveys and 
the Convention Delegates Survey, I find that elite women are more liberal than elite men 
on issues of social welfare and social issues, such as abortion and school prayer. In 
regards to social welfare, these differences between elite men and women mirror the 
differences we find among the political non-elite. However, on issues of abortion and 
school prayer, elite women’s preferences do not necessarily correspond with non-elite 
women’s preferences. Among non-elites, men and women tend to agree on social issues. 
This difference between elites and non-elites highlights a key empirical contribution of 
the dissertation. A common claim among descriptive representation scholars is that if 
female legislators pursue their preferences in office, they are representing women 
generally. However, as pointed out in Chapter 4, the differences that arise between elites 
and non-elites call into question any assumption of  “automatic” representation of women 
by female legislators. 
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To test directly the effect of politically exploitable heterogeneity on the gender 
gap in Congress I relied on two distinct measures of the concept, each with their 
advantages and disadvantages. The first measure was based on national survey data. 
Respondents’ most important issue was used to measure the relative priority of the issue 
of education and the correlation between issue importance and respondents’ policy 
position on education was used to measure the level of bias on the issue of education. The 
key disadvantage of the survey measure was the lack of predictive validity; the level of 
bias in the district was uncorrelated with the level of electoral competition in the district. 
The second measure was based on individual contributions to political action committees 
(PACs). The percentage of individual contributions given to PACs that advocate on the 
issue of education was used to measure the relative importance of education. The partisan 
bias of these PACs in their contributions to candidates was used to measure the level of 
bias in the district on the issue of education. Unlike the survey measure, the contributions 
measure had a moderately strong correlation with electoral competition.  
Measuring politically exploitable heterogeneity is difficult due to the complexity 
of the concept and both the survey measure and the contributions measure involved 
serious compromises. The biggest compromise was on measuring the presence of intense 
preference minorities. Ideally we would like to measure the presence of intense 
preference minorities across all issues in the district that each legislative candidate would 
like to trade on to create an electoral coalition. However, this was impossible to do for 
multiple reasons. First, the survey data did not ask policy preferences on more than a 
handful of important issues. Second, even if we do have the level of bias on all issues in 
the district, we do not know which issues each candidate would prefer to include in their 
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electoral coalition. The unsatisfying compromise was to try to measure whether there is 
an intense preference minority present on the issue of education and to assume that there 
is a minority available on another issue the legislator would like to trade for the issue of 
education. 
Despite these problems with the measures, I find consistent results on the effect of 
issue importance and issue bias on the gender gap across the two measures. I estimate the 
modifying effect of issue importance and issue bias on the gender gap on education votes 
using a standard OLS model pooling across four Congresses from 1992 to 2000. I 
expected the modifying effect of issue importance to be negative, but substantively 
insignificant, and the modifying effect of bias to be positive and substantively significant. 
I find that as issue importance increases in the district, the gender gap decreases and the 
decrease is substantively significant for the contributions data. Contrary to expectations, 
issue bias also decreases the size of the gender gap. This decrease is substantively 
significant, especially for the survey data. In Chapter 6, I briefly discussed a possible 
interpretation of these results; below I discuss in more detail the implications of the 
results for the theory. 
  
7.2 Implications of Results 
 As discussed in Chapter 6, my results are consistent with Fiorina’s (1974) model 
of legislative behavior. He argues that as issue importance increases, legislators will be 
more tied to the opinion of the constituency that cares about the issue. He also argues that 
when two groups in the constituency care about the issue legislators will be especially 
responsive to their demands when the two groups agree, a situation that corresponds with 
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the presence of an intense preference minority in my theory. The key difference between 
Fiorina’s model and my model hinges on the effect of an intense preference minority on 
legislator divergence. The effect of bias in the district on the gender gap seems to support 
Fiorina’s expectations. 
Despite these early discouraging results for my theory of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity, I argue the theory makes two important contributions to political science 
and deserves further exploration. First, the problems with Fiorina’s model, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, remain. Fiorina assumes that legislators vote in Congress on an issue-by-
issue basis because, he argues, they cannot predict which issues will come up for a vote. 
However, this assumption ignores the electoral arena in which political promises are 
made. Candidates generally do not make promises on only one issue during a campaign 
and constituents do not only care about one issue. In Fenno’s seminal book on 
Congressional behavior at home, he argues that representatives create coalitions in the 
district and work very hard to balance these interests (Fenno 1978). The question then 
becomes, how do representatives translate their coalition activities in the district to their 
voting behavior in the Congress? Sulkin (2005) finds that legislators are not only looking 
forward to their next election when determining their behavior. Instead, the issues the 
opposing candidate raised during the last election find their way onto a representative’s 
agenda. In this dissertation, I have suggested another possible connection between the 
electoral arena and Congressional behavior. I argue it is important to understand the 
connection between how legislators form their electoral coalitions and how legislators 
behave in office. 
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Second, Fiorina, among many others, argue that heterogeneity in the district leads 
to legislator divergence. However, the conceptual definition of heterogeneity is rarely 
spelled out to guide measurement of the concept and most scholars have reverted to 
demographic diversity as a proxy. Using demographic diversity, however, has lead to 
inconsistent results. It is unclear from the current theoretical literature why diversity in 
income should lead to legislator divergence but diversity in racial background should not. 
While the results in this dissertation are not supportive of my theory of politically 
exploitable heterogeneity, I have begun to define the concept in a way that can help us to 
measure heterogeneity in the future and possibly resolve the inconsistent results in the 
literature. 
 
7.3 Further Research 
As discussed, it is possible the theoretical definition of politically exploitable 
heterogeneity is wrong. Before making this assessment, it is important to give the 
measurement of the theory one more attempt given the difficulty of translating concept to 
measure and the current inadequacies of the measures available. Moving forward, I 
would start smaller with a qualitative look at some key districts. An important 
comparison would be to study high diversity districts where, according to current 
measures, some have low bias on the issue of education and some have high bias on the 
issue of education and some are represented by men while others are represented by 
women. This comparison would enable us to distinguish between politically exploitable 
heterogeneity and politically non-exploitable heterogeneity and begin to differentiate 
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among demographically diverse districts as to which would lead to legislator divergence 
and which would not.  
This smaller qualitative comparison would allow us to create a more in-depth 
measure. Ideally, we would begin by getting a fuller picture of the issues that are relevant 
in the district as well as an understanding of the distribution of constituent preferences on 
the issues. Next, we could match up this characterization of the district’s interests with 
the actual platforms of each of the candidates. An interesting comparison would be 
between districts with similar sets of important issues but appear to differ on the presence 
of intense preference minorities and analyze whether candidates have different electoral 
platforms. Finally, it would be necessary to then connect the platforms during election 
season to the actual behavior of these representatives in Congress. While this research 
plan would be an extensive and in-depth look at only a few districts, and therefore not 
necessarily generalizable to other districts, it would provide a foundation for pursuing 
measurement of the theory of politically exploitable heterogeneity. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 This dissertation was originally motivated by a desire to understand when women 
behave differently than men in Congress and whether this difference meant better 
representation for women generally. Women have historically been excluded from 
political office at the national level and have only made real in-roads to these arenas of 
political power in the last decade. Even now, the increase in the number of women in 
national office has stagnated, with merely twenty percent of our national legislature 
occupied by women. While this dissertation has not yet been able to fully explain how 
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women negotiate the constraints of political office to bring a unique voice to the 
legislature, what is clear is that women make a difference in office. There are substantive 
and persistent gender differences in Congressional voting. Whether this difference 
necessarily means that women generally are better represented is a thorny question, 
highlighted by the difference I find between elite and non-elite women in their attitudes. 
However, what is certain is that having women in political office has the potential to have 
an important effect on our political outcomes. Understanding how this is possible given 
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